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This Doctoral Thesis includes three empirical essays on financial reporting quality and cor-
porate social responsibility. In chapter one we examine a set of CSR-disasters and argue
that stakeholders become more critical of CSR performance in industries affected by the
disasters. Our setting allows us to study whether socially enforced increases in CSR perfor-
mance create sufficient improvements in firms’ corporate culture to positively affect financial
reporting quality. In chapter two we study the consequences of missing analyst forecasts for
CSR and non-CSR firms. Finally, in chapter three I study heterogeneous CSR strategies in
firms that have the same CSR performance and its consequences.
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Introduction
This Doctoral Thesis consists of three empirical papers that focus on the intersection between
financial reporting quality (FRQ) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the light of
the existing demands that firms take steps to ensure that CSR is inherent in their businesses,
the questions of how to implement CSR practices and how to measure the impact of CSR on
firms’ other attributes (e.g. accounting quality), remain largely unanswered. I study these
issues in this Thesis.
The first paper is titled “Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting
Quality: Evidence from CSR-Disasters” (co-authored with Juan M. Garcia Lara and Beat-
riz Garcia Osma). In this paper, we introduce the concept of CSR-disasters and argue that
stakeholders become more critical of CSR performance in industries affected by the disasters.
CSR-disasters are large technological disasters that can be attributed to particular firms and
that trigger attention for CSR performance. CSR-disasters enable us to isolate plausibly ex-
ogenous increases in CSR performance for firms that operate in affected industries. These
settings allow us to study whether socially enforced increases in CSR performance create
sufficient improvements in firms’ corporate culture for having a positive effect on financial
reporting quality. We find that firms with low pre-disaster CSR performance significantly
improve CSR in the post-disaster period, mainly through window dressing practices. For
these firms, CSR increases lead to greater earnings management and lower quality of nar-
rative disclosure. This suggests that demand-driven CSR practices may lead to unfavorable
outcomes and, in particular, impair transparency. We contribute to the literature in several
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ways. First, we add to studies addressing how technological and natural disasters shape firms’
behavior. We focus on the question of whether CSR-disasters’ initiated CSR performance
creates sufficient changes in firms’ corporate culture for having a positive impact on FRQ.
Second, we extend prior research that provides mixed evidence on the link between CSR and
FRQ. Finally, our results contribute to the literature that studies whether, compared with
non-CSR firms, CSR firms perform better when they face idiosyncratic or systematic shocks.
We show that firms in the industries affected by the disasters, in fact, do improve their CSR
performance in the post-disaster periods. Furthermore, the increase in CSR performance
varies depending on pre-disaster levels of CSR. In line with the prior research, we argue that
CSR builds goodwill in crises time, when stakeholders’ scrutiny inevitably increases.
I turn to the question of how financial analysts view CSR firms in my second paper,
entitled “Do Markets Reward CSR Firms? Evidence from Target Beating Behavior” (co-
authored with Antonio B. Vazquez). We study the capital markets consequences of missing
analyst forecasts for CSR and non-CSR firms. We hypothesize that CSR firms may have
lower capital markets penalties. First, CSR firms may have different investors that are less
critical of short-term performance. Second, previous CSR performance may create goodwill
in the form of high reputation and strong connections with stakeholders that helps preventing
negative market expectations regarding future prospects. We show that in the group of firms
that miss analyst forecasts (‘missers’) CSR firms experience lower negative price revisions,
proxied by 3-day returns surrounding the release of the earnings announcement. Further,
we find that in the group of firms that miss the target, CSR firms with larger proportion of
long-term investors receive a lower penalty. Finally, we find that CSR firms undertake less
short-sighted actions, proxied by earnings management, to achieve the target. We conclude
that high CSR performance helps to prevent negative market expectations regarding future
firms’ prospects and, thus, mitigates negative price revisions in the case of target missing.
We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that CSR firms have lower incentives to
engage in target beating behavior, as they receive a lower market penalty for target missing.
7
Finally, our results highlight the insurance benefit of CSR and show how investors adjust
their beliefs about the future performance of ‘missers,’ with differing attitudes toward CSR.
Finally, the third paper “Different Similarities and Similar Differences. New Evidence
on Corporate Social Responsibility” investigates heterogeneous CSR strategies in firms that
have the same CSR performance and its consequences. In particular, I aim to address
the following questions: Do heterogeneous CSR strategies that underpin the same CSR
performance matter? What can we learn about CSR beyond CSR performance? First, I
find that firms with the same CSR performance but with different CSR strategies differ
in size, age, profitability, cash holdings, leverage, and research intensity. Second, I find
that CSR strategy has an association with future CSR and financial performance, which is
unrelated to the current CSR performance. Overall, these results provide additional insights
on CSR that have not been previously captured by CSR performance. I contribute to the
literature that studies how firms differ along different CSR dimensions. I show that there is a
heterogeneity between firms with the same average CSR performance and this heterogeneity
has an association with future CSR and financial performance.
This Thesis has benefited from the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Science (ECO2016-77579), FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636), CAM (H2015/HUM-
3353), and the International Mobility Program, UC3M. All errors are mine.
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Chapter 1




The debate over the desirability of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (Ferrell
et al. 2016; Hart and Zingales 2017) has resulted in the mandatory implementation of social
obligations for the private sector in some countries.1 In the recent spate of technological
disasters, proponents of obligatory state-regulated CSR raise with new vigor. For instance,
after the BP oil spill of 2010, President Obama argued that “one of the lessons we’ve learned
from this spill is that we need better regulations, better safety standards, and better enforce-
ment when it comes to offshore drilling” (Obama 2010). Further, Mr. Obama “acknowledged
that federal agencies had failed to ensure that safety and environmental standards were being
1 For instance, in 2013, the Government of India (Ministry of Corporate Affairs) enacted Section 135 of
the Indian Companies Act that obligates all companies that meet specified financial thresholds to spend 2%
of average net profits on CSR (Government of India 2016). Denmark, South Africa, China, Malaysia, and
Brazil have a mandatory reporting obligation on the amount spent on CSR activities (Ioannou and Serafeim
2017).
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met and announced a thorough review of the oversight process” (Broder and Cooper 2010).
This implied that not only BP, but all other firms dedicated to offshore drilling were also
under suspicion of lacking social responsibility.
Despite the salience of CSR issues, there is a shortage of empirical evidence on whether
enforced (either regulatory enforced or socially enforced) and voluntary CSR practices have
identical properties and lead to similar social surplus. In this study, we introduce the concept
of CSR-disasters and argue that these disasters enable us to isolate plausibly exogenous
increases in socially enforced CSR performance for firms that operate in affected industries.
These settings allow us to study whether socially enforced increases in CSR performance
creates sufficient improvements in firms’ corporate culture for having a positive effect on
financial reporting quality.
Prior studies have explored the link between CSR and financial reporting quality
(FRQ), focusing in particular on earnings management practices. For instance, Kim et
al. (2012) argue that CSR firms are more critical of ethical issues including incidents of earn-
ings management. For CSR firms, these authors find limited evidence of aggressive earnings
management through abnormal accruals and real activities manipulation. However, one
could argue that in equilibrium, firms voluntarily and simultaneously choose to engage in
CSR and avoid earnings management. If that is the case, it might be problematic to infer
whether high CSR performance in fact affects financial reporting quality.
To address this issue, we focus on a simple framework. We argue that CSR-disasters
plausibly provide a randomly assigned increase in CSR performance (see following discussion)
and thereby help to eliminate the problem of simultaneity. In other words, this setting allows
us to attribute any change in financial reporting quality to the influence of CSR. Further,
observing ex-post the sign of the change (or no change) in financial reporting quality helps
to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘window dressing’ CSR,2 where, following prior literature,
we define CSR as voluntary stakeholder-oriented actions that improve social conditions and
2 True CSR is associated with real changes in corporate ethical standards. In contrast, window dressing
CSR practices are not associated with firms’ internalization of CSR policies as high ethical standards.
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that are not required by the law and extend beyond firm’s profit maximization (McWilliams
and Siegel 2000; Godfrey et al. 2009; Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Liang and Renneboog 2017).
We use a set of technological disasters as our proxy for CSR-disasters. By definition,
a technological disaster refers to a failure of a technological structure or/and human error in
controlling or using the technology.3 Examples of technological disasters can be explosions,
chemical spills, or gas leaks.4 We focus on major technological disasters that were not caused
by the formal violation of the law or malice, but rather, by a set of failures in meeting
technological, environmental and ethical standards. As an illustrative example, consider the
garment factory collapse in Rana Plaza, Dhaka on April 24, 2013. If the clothing companies
that operated in the Bangladesh factory (Primark or Canada’s Loblaw) had gone further
than just meeting their formal obligations, it is likely that the collapse could have been
prevented. For instance, instead of blindly accepting the building certificate issued by the
Bangladeshi authorities, clothing firms could have sent “people to check every pillar.”5 Key
to our identification strategy is that the collapse provoked a reaction not only from the
firms that directly operated in Rana Plaza, but also from other firms in the industry. More
than 150 companies signed a legally binding agreement (The Accord on Fire and Safety in
Bangladesh) and 27 US brands signed their own non-legally binding industry-led version (The
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety).6 These agreements facilitate worker-management
committees in factories and obligate companies to independently inspect factories, provide
3 Following the definition proposed by The Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) a technological
disaster is an event caused by a malfunction of a technological structure and/or some human error in
controlling or handling the technology. The effects on families and individuals may be long lasting and can
endure for years. However, symptoms may appear gradually, and impacts may not be seen immediately. For
more details follow Lindsey et al. (2017). In this study we use the terms disaster, disaster event, catastrophe,
and treatment interchangeably.
4 For example, Pek et al. (2018) classify the following events as technological disasters: chemical spills,
collapses, explosions, fires, gas leaks, poisonings, radiation leaks, and large-scale transportation accidents.
Perhaps the most famous technological disasters are The BP oil spill on April 20, 2010 and The Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear incident on March 11, 2011.
5 The Economist (May 4th, 2013). https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/05/04/disaster-at-
rana-plaza.
6 The Accord on Fire and Safety is a “legally binding agreement between companies and unions where
companies commit to independent inspections and transparent reporting, including developing strong worker-
management committees in factories” (Gifford and Ansett 2014).
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transparent reports, and, if necessary, financially contribute to fix detected problems.7
In this study, we define CSR-disasters as technological disasters that (1) are sufficiently
large to affect the whole disaster-affected industry; and (2) that, plausibly, could have been
prevented or mitigated if a firm had gone further than just meeting the minimum formal
obligations imposed by law. As a result of these CSR-disasters, same-industry firms (treated
firms)8 (1) are exposed to a negative stakeholder reaction (negative shock); and (2) may
undertake efforts to mitigate it (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Desai 2011; Diestre and Ra-
jagopalan 2014; Pek et al. 2018).
In our tests, we exploit a set of major technological disasters, as reported by The
International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) that occurred between 2004 and 2012 in the US.
We measure CSR performance using MSCI (formely KLD) data. Using a research design
similar to Flammer (2015), we apply a differences-in-difference approach to estimate the
effect of the disasters on CSR. More specifically, if a firm operates in an industry that is
exposed to a technological disaster, we compute the difference in CSR before and after the
catastrophe. Then we compare this difference with the corresponding difference in industries
that are not affected by the catastrophe.
We argue that a CSR-disaster is a negative shock to the relationship between a firm
and its stakeholders. Given that stakeholders’ positive attitude in the form of firm’s so-
cial capital has a valuable effect on firm’s financial performance (Lev et al. 2010; Cheng et
al. 2014; Shiu and Yang 2017), managers have to undertake actions to restore this relation-
ship. Thus, we expect that firms improve CSR performance in the post-disaster period. We
propose two possible mechanisms through which strengthening CSR performance may lead
to strengthening the relation between a firm and its stakeholders. First, because high CSR
performance can help to differentiate treated firms from the guilty firm by signalling the low
7 In addition to the agreements, a dozen global brands (including Gap, H&M, Mango, and Walmart) have
contributed $21.5m to Rana plaza Donors Trust Fund, which was set up to award compensations to victims
and their families (Westervelt 2015).
8 Henceforth, when we refer to treated firms we mean firms that operate in disaster affected industries
(treated industries) other than firms that directly caused the disasters. Section 3 provides details about
CSR-disasters used.
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operational risk and high preparation for the possible regulatory changes associated with
the disaster (Heflin and Wallace 2017). Second, an increase in CSR performance can signal
firms’ social awareness and high environmental and social standards that do not necessarily
mitigate firms’ risk. Prior literature suggests that CSR helps to build social capital and to
form stakeholders’ positive attitudes, which would mitigate the negative consequences of a
possible disaster (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009). We find strong evidence that treated
firms improve CSR performance in the post-disasters periods.
Next, we address whether firms’ response to a CSR-disaster is sensitive to the pre-
disaster level of CSR. Prior literature suggests that firms with previously accumulated social
capital in the form of high CSR performance can mitigate negative market reactions because
(1) market participants expect that these firms have lower costs associated with the disaster
(Godfrey et al. 2009); and (2) because these firms have social trust and stakeholders’ loyalty
(Godfrey 2005; Shiu and Yang 2017). Further, incremental increases in CSR performance
may not be equally useful for firms with different pre-disaster CSR performance. For in-
stance, Clarkson et al. (2004) show that in the pulp and paper industry only low-polluting
firms (e.g. firms with high environmental CSR performance) extract incremental economic
benefit from environmental expenditures. We show that only firms with low pre-disaster
CSR improve CSR in the post-treatment periods.
Finally, we study whether socially enforced CSR performance leads to better FRQ.
Following Kim et al. (2012) we argue that improvement in true CSR performance leads to
enhancement in all corporate ethical standards. Firms that exert efforts and spend resources
to achieve high social, ethical, and environmental standards may apply these standards to all
their business decisions, including financial reporting. For instance, Atkins (2006) argue that
being socially responsible means being transparent in firms’ financial reporting. Conversely,
if CSR-disasters generate entirely window dressing improvements in CSR performance, then
there will be a negative or no relationship between CSR and FRQ in the post-disaster period.
We use earnings management and narrative disclosure quality as two alternative proxies
13
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for financial reporting quality. We measure earnings management using discretionary accru-
als (Jones 1991; Subramanyam 1996; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005)
and real activities manipulation proxies (Roychowdhury 2006). We employ the Bog Index
as a proxy for the quality of narrative disclosure (Bonsall et al. 2017). Our results show that
for firms with low pre-disaster level of CSR, there is a negative relationship between CSR
and FRQ in the post-disaster period. These firms increase earnings management through
abnormal discretionary accruals and have lower readability of their disclosure.
Our findings indicate that treated firms respond to CSR-disasters by improving subse-
quent CSR performance and that this exogenous increase in CSR leads to deterioration in
FRQ. We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the literature that
studies how technological and natural disasters shape firms behavior (Desai 2011; Diestre
and Rajagopalan 2014) and, in particular, how these disasters trigger attention towards
CSR (Heflin and Wallace 2017; Liang and Renneboog 2017). Heflin and Wallace (2017)
study whether firms in the oil and gas industries with extensive environmental disclosure
suffer from lower negative price revision in the post BP-oil spill period. We focus on the
question of whether CSR-disasters’ initiated CSR performance creates sufficient changes in
firms’ corporate culture for having a positive impact on FRQ. Noteworthy, we do not re-
strict changes in CSR performance only to real CSR practices. Rather, we empirically study
whether the improvement in CSR performance is driven by ‘real’ or window dressing prac-
tices. In contrast, Heflin and Wallace (2017), by focusing on environmental disclosure, test
how the disclosure of ‘real’ CSR actions impact stock prices. Finally, we explore a set of
major technological disasters, while Heflin and Wallace (2017) focuses on one-event the BP
oil spill. Our study is different from Liang and Renneboog (2017) in that they investigate
whether firms’ choice to participate in disasters relief depends on their countries’ legal origin.
In our paper, we focus on the question of whether a forced improvement in firms’ CSR per-
formance creates a sufficient shift in their corporate culture. In our settings, improvement
in CSR performance is exogenous towards firms’ specific characteristics and, thus, does not
14
Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence
from CSR-Disasters
reflect firms’ choice. Second, using the KLD database allows us to distinguish whether the
improvement in the CSR performance is channeled through increases in CSR strengths or
decreases in CSR concerns.
Second, we extend prior research that provides mixed evidence on the link between
CSR and FRQ (Petrovits 2006; Prior et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2012). While Kim et al. 2012
document that, on average, firms with better FRQ are associated with higher CSR, Prior
et al. 2008 claim that managers, who engage in earnings management, are more inclined
to implement CSR, than their counterparts, who do not engage in earnings management.
However, these results might potentially be driven by other correlated omitted variables,
which is difficult to account for in the absence of exogenous variation in CSR. In our study,
the usage of technological disasters (CSR-disasters) allows us to identify exogenous variations
in CSR performance and eliminate the impact of potential confounding factors. We show
that higher CSR performance leads to lower FRQ. This result is important in light of the
current discussion about whether firms should be required to spend a share of their profits
on CSR policies.
Finally, our results contribute to the literature that studies whether, comparing with
non-CSR firms, CSR firms perform better when they face idiosyncratic or systematic shocks
(Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009; Lins et al. 2017). For instance, Godfrey 2005 and God-
frey et al. 2009 show that CSR performance limits the negative impact of firms’ idiosyncratic
shocks on stock prices. Further, Lins et al. 2017 show that CSR firms perform better during
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, since their stakeholders have higher trust in them. We show
that firms in the industries affected by the disasters, in fact, do improve their CSR perfor-
mance in the post-disaster periods. Furthermore, the increase in CSR performance varies
depending on pre-disaster levels of CSR. In line with the previous research we argue that
CSR builds goodwill in crises time, when stakeholders’ scrutiny inevitably increases.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature and presents our
hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the data and methodology, while Section 1.4 presents
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results. Section 1.5 shows additional analyses and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
To derive theoretical predictions on the firms’ reaction to the CSR disasters, we draw from
different strands of literature. We begin this section by analyzing prior literature to argue
that affected firms can use CSR as a response to CSR-disasters. Next, we hypothesize how
the pre-disaster level of CSR influences the response to these disasters. Finally we investigate
how changes in CSR performance affect firms’ financial reporting quality.
1.2.1 Firms’ Response to CSR-Disasters through Corporate Social
Responsibility
Prior literature documents that natural disasters generate waves of corporate donations and
subsequent increases in CSR performance (Muller and Kräussl 2011; Madsen and Rodgers
2015). In this section, we ask whether CSR-disasters provoke subsequent improvements in
CSR performance in firms that are exposed to the negative spillover effects.
CSR-disasters also generate negative spillover effects that can be substantial for firms in
the same-industry.9 For instance, as a result of CSR-disasters, same-industry firms (treated
firms) are exposed to negative consequences such as negative abnormal stock returns (Diestre
and Rajagopalan 2014; Heflin and Wallace 2017) and higher scrutiny from regulators (Desai
2011). In our framework, if it is revealed through a highly visible CSR-disaster that one firm
in the industry neglects CSR standards in environmental, safety or technological related
9 The phenomenon that one firm’s deviant behavior can result in the punishment of other (not responsible)
firms in the same industry is discussed in prior studies (Desai 2011; Diestre and Rajagopalan 2014; Liang and
Renneboog 2017). Diestre and Rajagopalan (2014) suggest that in the short run, market participants tend
to form their beliefs, based on the highly visible and available information, such as belonging to one industry.
The authors provide two reasons for the spillover. First, firms in one industry may have the same third party
relationships (e.g. relationships with suppliers) which may cause the accident. The second explanation comes
from the socio cognitive literature. External audiences predict organizations’ future behavior based on the
behavior of industry peers (for more details, see Diestre and Rajagopalan (2014, 1130-1131)). For more
evidence on the negative spillover effect, follow Appendix F.
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matters, other firms in the same industry become suspect of also violating these norms.
Thus, we study how firms that experience negative spillover effects respond to CSR disasters.
A CSR-disaster is a negative shock to the relation of the firm with its stakeholders. We
propose two possible mechanisms that explain why an improvement in CSR performance in
the post-disaster period may lead to an improvement in the firm-stakeholders relation.
First, firms may improve CSR performance to signal that they are less risky and have
high quality operational processes and, overall, to differentiate themselves from the guilty
firm in terms of safety. Heflin and Wallace (2017) propose that large technological disasters
update investors’ expectations on the likelihood of the recurrence of the disaster and the
following regulatory changes. Further, the authors study the case of the BP oil spill in 2010
and show that firms in the oil and gas industry improve their environmental performance
in the post-disaster period. Heflin and Wallace (2017) argue that firms improve their CSR
in the post-disaster period to signal their readiness for possible regulatory changes. Overall,
this leads to the prediction that true CSR-performance increases after CSR-disasters.
Further, we draw from the research that argues that CSR can contribute to firms’
positive image and by doing so can add to the relationship with stakeholders. In particular,
we argue that to be useful, improvements in CSR performance do not necessary need to
directly reduce firms’ operational risk. Firms can simply improve CSR to signal their ethical
and environmental standards (window dressing CSR). Uzzi (1997) and Godfrey et al. (2009)
argue that CSR performance creates the moral capital that helps to improve the relationship
with stakeholders. Further, using a risk management model, Godfrey (2005) shows that this
moral capital can contribute to shareholders’ wealth in the time of disasters. We hypothesize
that in firms with higher CSR performance stakeholders are more loyal in the post-disaster
period and, thus, impose lower penalties.
Based on prior literature, our prediction is that after CSR-disasters, affected firms
(treated firms) increase CSR to signal their operational quality and social awareness and,
thus, to improve their relationship with stakeholders and subsequent financial performance.
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This hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows:
H1: Firms in the industry that experience a CSR-disaster (treated firms) improve
their CSR performance in the post-disaster period.
1.2.2 Pre-disaster Level of CSR Performance
Firms with different pre-disaster levels of CSR may differently react to CSR-related negative
externalities, and improve their CSR to different extents in a post-disaster period. This
would hold, first, if firms with high pre-disaster CSR performance do not suffer from negative
market reactions. Then, these firms would not be incentivized to change their CSR. Godfrey
(2005) and Godfrey et al. (2009) introduce the view that CSR performance has an ‘insurance-
like effect,’ whereby CSR performance limits the potential negative impact on stock price of
negative events related to corporate operations. In other words, CSR expenditures act as an
insurance premium that the firm pays to avoid market losses in the case of a negative event.
Firms with strong reputation for CSR suffer less because (1) they are expected to have lower
costs associated with the disaster in the future (Godfrey et al. 2009); and (2) because they
have accumulated ‘moral reputational capital’ (Godfrey 2005; Shiu and Yang 2017).
In line with this view, Lins et al. (2017) argue that high CSR performance accumulates
firm-specific social capital in the form of trust between a firm and both its stakeholders
and investors. This social capital pays off during periods when the overall level of trust
in corporations is low. Further, these authors show that firms with high CSR performance
outperform their peers during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In related research, Muller and
Kräussl (2011) show that the more a firm is known for socially irresponsibility the greater
was the negative impact of Hurricane Katrina on the stock prices and greater the probability
that this firm improved its CSR performance in the post-Katrina period (through corporate
philanthropic disaster response). Heflin and Wallace (2017) argue that firms in the oil and
gas industry with high environmental disclosure before the BP oil spill of 2010 experience less
negative equity share price changes because market participants expect that the costs of the
18
Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence
from CSR-Disasters
disaster will be lower for these firms. Further, they show that firms with poor environmental
disclose in the pre-spill period improve their disclosure in the post-disaster period. The
authors also show that this improvement in disclosure is not entirely window dressing and
that it is associated with an improvement in environmental performance.
A second reason why firms may differently react to CSR-disasters is that marginal
increases in CSR performance may be not equally useful for firms with different pre-disaster
CSR performance. For instance, Clarkson et al. (2004) show that the market does not
equally value environmental expenditure for different firms in the pulp and paper industry.
Specifically, only low-polluting firms extract incremental economic benefit from environmen-
tal expenditures. The market does not value environmental expenditures for high-polluting
firms and further assess them by the existence of unbooked environmental liabilities.
Based on this prior literature we assume that firms with lower-CSR performance before
the disaster have more incentives to improve firm-stakeholders relationships and, thus, they
will improve their CSR more in the post-treatment period.
Against this backdrop, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Firms in CSR-disaster industries (treated firms) with lower pre-disaster
CSR performance improve their CSR more in the post-disaster period.
1.2.3 CSR Effects on Financial Reporting and Disclosure Quality
Following Kim et al. (2012) we argue that improvements in CSR performance lead to en-
hancement in all corporate ethical standards. Firms that exert efforts and spend resources
to achieve high social, ethical, and environmental standards may use these standards in
all their business decisions, including financial reporting. For instance, Atkins (2006) ar-
gue that being socially responsible means being transparent in financial reporting. Thus, if
CSR-disasters cause increases in true CSR performance, we should observe an improvement
of financial reporting quality.
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Alternatively, if CSR-disasters induce purely window dressing CSR, then there will be
a negative or no effect on FRQ. The main reason for this could be that window dressing
CSR does not lead to improvements in corporate ethical standards or may even be associated
with managerial misbehavior. For instance, Petrovits (2006) shows that managers use firms’
payments to their corporate foundations to manage financial reporting targets, and Prior
et al. (2008) show that managers that engage in earnings management have incentives to
use CSR to please stakeholders and gain their support. Given this mixed evidence on the
relationship between CSR and FRQ we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Increases in CSR performance that are induced by CSR-disasters affect
financial reporting and disclosure quality.
1.3 Data and Sample Selection
1.3.1 International Disasters Data
To construct a set of CSR-disasters we use a set of major technological disasters that took
place in the US and that we obtain from The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT).10
EM-DAT is widely used in the literature (e.g. Evan et al. (2011); Lutz et al. (2014); Lesk et
al. (2016)) and well-known as one of the most comprehensive databases on disaster events in
the world (Voigt et al. 2016). This database has information about natural (geophysical, me-
teorological, hydrological, etc.) and technological (industrial, transport, and miscellaneous)
disasters. Each event is accompanied by the information on date and type of the event,
country name, location, total deaths, total number of people affected, and total damage in
monetary units.11 Each event in EM-DAT meets at least one of the following criteria: over 10
deaths, over 100 people affected (and/or injured, homeless), and a request for international
10 EM-DAT is publicly available data. For more details follow http://www.emdat.be/.
11 Total deaths (definition considered in EM-DAT): it is the sum of deaths and missing. Total affected
(definition considered in EM-DAT): it is the sum of the injured, affected and left homeless after a disaster.
(http://www.emdat.be)
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assistance and/or declaration by the government of a state of emergency.
For the period from 2004 to 2012 EM-DAT provides three major (classified by total
damage) technological disasters. The most harmful one is the BP oil spill of April 20, 2010
(EVENT I). The rig explosion was owned by Transocean and drilling for BP. This explosion
killed 11 people and caused a damage of over $20 billion. After the oil well explosion, 4.9
million barrels of oil and gas leaked into the Gulf of Mexico.
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
(the presidential commission) concluded that the disaster was avoidable and was caused in
part by a series of poor cost-cutting decisions made by management and by overall lack of
safety culture.12 “BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that key decisions
in the months leading up to the blow-out were safe or sound from an engineering perspec-
tive.” It added that “[g]overnment oversight [...] must be accompanied by the oil and gas
industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental
transformation of its safety culture. Only through such a demonstrated transformation will
industry—in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster—truly earn the privilege of
access to the nation’s energy resources located on federal properties.” In a chapter of its final
report, the presidential commission emphasizes the importance of culture that has to ensure
priority of safety and responsibility at the executive level. “The critical common element
is an unwavering commitment to safety at the top of an organization: the CEO and board
of directors must create the culture and establish the conditions under which everyone in
a company shares responsibility for maintaining a relentless focus on preventing accidents.
Likewise, for the entire industry, leadership needs to come from the CEOs collectively, who
can apply pressure on their peers to enhance performance” (National Commission 2011).
12 The commission uses definition that is formulated by The United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive
and defines safety culture as the product of individual and group values, attitudes, and perceptions, com-
petencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an
organisation’s health and safety management. It adds that [a] more popular description is that safety culture
means doing the right thing even when the no one is watching. There are two kinds of safety: occupational
safety, which refers to keeping people safe, and process safety, which refers to the procedures for minimizing
risk more generally.
21
Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence
from CSR-Disasters
In his interview, Donald F. Boesch, a member of the investigating commission,said that
they had identified “a whole sequence of poor decisions with unfortunate consequences when
put together.”13 Overall, the evidence from the presidential commission indicates that BP
suffered from a lack of ethical and safety standards that may have prevented the explosion.
We use the BP oil spill as our first event and, following prior studies (Heflin and Wallace
2017), we consider industries with SIC codes 13 (Oil and Gas Extraction) and 29 (Petroleum
Refining and Related Industries) as treated by this disaster.
According to EM-DAT, the second largest technological disaster is the Georgia Sugar
Refinery Explosion. On February 7, 2008, dust exploded on the Imperial Sugar refinery in
Port Wentworth, Georgia. The accident caused 13 deaths, injuries to 40 people, and damage
over $323 million. According to the investigation by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives sugar
dust was the fuel for the fire. The disaster occurred in the Cane Sugar Refining industry
(SIC Code 2062) and was directly caused by the process of sugar refinery. Other industries
within SIC code 20 are not linked to refinery processes, therefore only SIC 2062 firms are
considered to be affected by the disaster. Given that observations with SIC code 2062 are
missing in our sample we do not include this disaster in our event study.14
The third largest event is the San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion. On September 9,
2010, natural gas pipeline, owned by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E, primary SIC Code
4931 – Electric and other Services Combined) company, exploded in San Bruno, California
(EVENT II). The explosion killed 8 and injured 58 people, destroyed 38 and damaged 70
homes, and destroyed a suburban neighbourhood. Consumer Protection and Safety Division
(CPSD) found that PG&E “violated accepted industry practice when constructing the section
13 BBC News (January 6th, 2011) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-12124830
14 Industries within SIC code 20 (Food and Kindred Products): 201 – Meat products; 202 – Dairy Products;
203 – Canned, Frozen, and Preserved Fruits, Vegetables, and Food Specialties; 204 – Grain Mill Products;
205 – Bakery Products; 206 – Sugar and Confectionery Products; 207 – Fats and Oils; 208 – Beverages;
209 – Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred Products. Within SIC code 206 only industry 206
only industry 2062 relates to sugar refinery. Rest industries are the following: 2061 – Cane Sugar, except
Refinery; 2063 – Beet Sugar; 2065 – Candy and other Confectionery Products; 2066 – Chocolate and Cocoa
Products; 2067 – Chewing Gum; 2068 – Salted and Roasted Nuts and Seeds.
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of pipe that failed.” It added that PG&E suffered from systemic failure of “corporate culture
to emphasize safety over profits” (California Public Utilities Comission 2012). During the
trial, it was shown that “the utility [PG&E] had cut its budget for pipeline inspection by
26 percent in 2009, the year before the explosion. The prosecution also showed an internal
document from 2008 that said profits were the company’s top priority; safety was fifth, or
last” (Fuller 2016). Overall, along with other factors, low corporate and safety standards
led to the explosion that, according to the mayor Mr. Ruane, was preventable. We consider
all firms with 49 SIC code as treated.
Finally, we include one event that is not presented in the EM-DAT as a technological
disaster, but to our knowledge, perfectly suits to our research settings. Our third event is
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster that occurred on March 11, 2011 in Japan (EVENT
III). The consequences of this disaster, however, affected the energy sector worldwide, includ-
ing the US. EM-DAT does not classify this event as technological for the following reason.
Initially, it was caused by the tsunami which, in turn, was caused by The Great East Japan
earthquake. However, according to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investiga-
tion Commission, the nuclear accident was foreseeable. The plant operator, Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO) failed to take basic security measures. Further, Naomi Hirose,
TEPCO president, admitted that ‘‘even if a tsunami caused the accident, we are the operator
of the Fukushima nuclear power plant and we do take responsibility” (Hirose 2015). Thus,
this event meets our two necessary conditions that are a) to be caused by business entities,
and b) to be sufficiently large. We consider all firms with 49 SIC code as treated.
1.3.2 Firm-level Data
CSR data is obtained from MSCI (formerly KLD).15 KLD covers the largest 3000 U.S.
publicly traded companies by market capitalization.16 KLD ratings are well known and
15 To rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by the fact that we use data from KLD, we repeat
our main analysis with ASSET4, as an alternative source of CSR data. For more details, follow Appendix
1.E.
16 Prior 2003 the composition of the covered firms was different. For more details, follow Appendix 1.B
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widely used in the CSR literature (e.g., Godfrey et al. (2009), Barnett and Salomon (2012),
Flammer (2015), Lins et al. (2017), and Fernando et al. (2017)). KLD provides information
on how firms address the needs of their stakeholders along different social dimensions, such
as environment, community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, products, corporate
governance, and controversial business issues, including alcohol, gambling, firearms, military,
nuclear power, and tobacco. Each social dimension is twofold and has both strength and
concern components.
We obtain accounting data from Compustat. For data on financial variables, we use
CRSP. Bog index is coming from Bonsall et al. (2017). Consistent with the previous research
(Kim et al. 2012), we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). All continuous variables
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions. Although the exact
number of observations depends on the specific regression, the baseline sample for which we
estimate the equations contains 16281 firm-year observations and 3114 unique firms for the
period 2003 - 2013.
1.3.3 Measurement of CSR and FRQ
CSR Measures
To construct our CSR proxy (CSR SCORE ), we follow Kim et al. (2012) and subtract
concern-related measures from strength-related ones among five social dimensions: environ-
ment, community, employee relations, diversity, and product. In 2010 the industry-based
key issue rating model was introduced to KLD.17 We circumvent this potential problem by
scaling each KLD dimension by the maximum value of this dimension within the year.18
The use of the aggregate proxy for CSR performance (CSR SCORE ) has been widely
17 Prior 2010 all of the positive ESG performance indicators were searched for all of the companies. Starting
from 2010, all companies are assessed for limited set of industry specific positive ESG indicators. For more
details follow Appendix 1.B.
18 For instance, in 2010 the maximim value of community strength dimension (com str num) is 4 (firm with
cusip = 45814010). Then, in 2010 we scale all community strength values by 4 (com str num/4).Thus, the
scaled KLD dimensions have values from 0 to 1.
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criticized (Entine 2003; Godfrey et al. 2009). The primary criticism stresses that the infor-
mation value in the individual social categories can be destroyed as a result of subtracting
concerns from strengths, as well as summing different social dimensions. Further, Lins
et al. (2017) emphasize that some components of CSR SCORE could be more critical to
enhancing the trust of all of a firm’s stakeholders than others. Thus, following Lins et
al. (2017), we desegregate CSR SCORE into two parts: those that mainly beneficial for ex-
ternal stakeholders (EXTERNAL) and those that mainly beneficial for internal stakeholders
(INTERNAL).
To measure financial reporting quality (FRQ), we use a number of earnings manage-
ment and narrative disclosure proxies that we describe in detail next.
Earnings Management Measures
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368), “[e]arnings management occurs when man-
agers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting
numbers.” We use discretionary accruals (Jones 1991; Subramanyam 1996; DeFond and
Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005) and real activities manipulation (Roychowdhury
2006) as two alternative earnings management proxies.19 To measure earnings management
through discretionary accruals we estimate Modified-Jones (1991) model that is augmented
by including ROAt−1 (Kothari et al. 2005). This model describes the expected level of ac-
cruals given firm fundamentals.20 To address the issue that earnings management can be
based on income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals (Warfield et al. 1995; Klein 2002),
19 Some recent studies caution that two stage models can lead to incorrect inferences (W. Chen et al. 2018). To
address this issue we repeat our main analysis but instead of using only second-step regressors we regress the
residual from a first step (ACC, AB CFO, AB EXP, or AB PROD) on the first- and second-step regressors.
Untabulated results confirm that results are qualitatively and quantitatively same to the main results of this
paper.
20 We use the residuals from the following annual cross-sectional industry regression model as estimates of
firm i’s discretionary accruals in time t: TAit/Ait−1 = α0(1/Ait−1) + α1((∆REVit − ∆RECit)/Ait−1) +
α2(PPEit/Ait−1) + α3(IBXIit−1/Ait−1) + εit
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we use absolute value of discretionary accruals for our analysis (ABS DA).
Roychowdhury (2006, p. 336) defines real activities manipulation (RAM) as “man-
agement actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary
objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds.” Following Roychowdhury 2006 we measure
RAM through (1) abnormal cash flow from operations (AB CFO), (2) abnormal production
costs (AB PROD), and (3) abnormal discretionary expenses (AB EXP).21 Further, following
Kim et al. (2012) we calculate fourth RAM proxy (COMBINED RAM ) as a linear combi-
nation of above three.22
Narrative Disclosure Quality
Lexical properties, or readability, of disclosure is an important dimension of FRQ (Li 2008).
The term “readability” refers to how complex a text is and how difficult it is to read it and
extract necessary information.23 In 1998 SEC issued the handbook promoting companies
to use “plain English” in writing all publicly disclosed documents. The SEC encourages
the use of short sentences, everyday words and active voice. Authors should be confident
that the final version of a document captures the original meaning, and it is written in the
easiest possible way. With this document SEC emphasizes importance of lexical properties
of financial disclosure and the effect it may have on investors and markets.
We use the Bog Index as our main proxy for readability (Bonsall et al. 2017). This
Index captures the processing costs associated with the type of language used in financial
disclosure. The Bog Index captures linguistic attributes such as sentence length, passive
21 The exact versions of the models are as equations (1), (4), and (5) in Roychowdhury (2006, p. 344-345).
The residuals from equations (1), (4), and (5) are our measure of AB CFO, AB PROD, and AB EXP,
respectively.
22 COMBINED RAM = AB CFO − AB PROD + AB EXP By the construction, COMBINED RAM
increases as firms constrain their RAM.
23 The Cambridge dictionary suggests the following meaning: “Easy and enjoyable to read” (http:
//dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/readable). The Oxford dictionary offers a sim-
ilar, but slightly different definition: “The quality of being legible or decipherable” (http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/readability).
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voice, weak verbs, overused words, complex words, and jargon (Bonsall et al. 2017). In
contrast to the Fog Index (Li 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2011), which counts all multi-
syllabic words as complex, the Bog Index measures words familiarity base on a proprietary




First, we measure how firms adjust their CSR after the disasters take place. We estimate
the following simple regression:
CSRi,T = β0 + β1CSR DISASTERi,t + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1 + β4MBi,t−1
+ β5LEVi,t−1 + β6CHi,t−1 + εi,t, (1.1)
where CSR DISASTER is a dummy variable that equals one for treated industries in the
years after the disasters (including the years of the disasters)24 and i indexes the company
and t indexes the year of the CSR-disaster. CSR is alternatively one of the following proxies:
CSR SCORE, EXTERNAL, or INTERNAL and T is t, t + 1, or t + 2.25 These are as
previously defined. The rest of the variables are as described in Appendix A. The set of
control variables is consistent with the previous research (Flammer 2015). We use year and
firm fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the two-digit SIC level.26 The coefficient
24 CSR DISASTER equals interaction between time dummy (time) and industry dummy (treated). Dummy
time and time fixed effect are collinear. Dummy treated and firm fixed effect are collinear. For that reason,
we do not include time and treated dummies in the regressions. Year and firm fixed effects help us to control
for omitted time- and firm-specific variables. Thus, as a main specification we use regression with year
and firms fixed effects and without year and treated dummies. We repeat all tests with time and treated
dummies and without year and firm fixed effects (i.e. the following specification: Dependent variable =
β0 +β1CSR DISASTER+β2time+β3treated+ ΣCONTROLSi,t + εi,t). All results are qualitatively and
quantitatively the same. For brevity, we do not tabulate them.
25 We awareness that a larger time window increases the risk that CSR reactions may be contaminated by
information that is unrelated to the CSR-disasters.
26 Here and after, following Bertrand et al. (2004) we cluster standard errors at the dimension of the treatment
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of interest is β1, which measures the difference in CSR performance between treated and
control firms after the technological disaster. If our tests support the hypothesis that firms
boost CSR performance after the catastrophes, the coefficient β1 is expected to be positive.
Instrumental variable (IV) Regressions
To study the effect of enforced CSR - instrumented by the CSR-disasters - on FRQ, we use
two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the first stage, we regress EXTERNAL27 on the CSR-
disasters. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
EXTERNALi,t+1 = β0 + β1CSR DISASTERi,t + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1 + β4MBi,t−1
+ β5LEVi,t−1 + β6CHi,t−1 + β7COMBINED RAMi,t−1 + β8RD INTi,t−1
+ β9AD IND INTi,t−1 + β10GOV ERNANCEi,t−1 + β11BIG4i,t−1
+ β12FIRM AGEi,t−1 + εi,t, (1.2)
where CSR DISASTER is as previously defined and all other variables are as described in
Appendix A. We use firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the two-digit
SIC level. The predicted values from Eq (1.2) provide the “instrumented” EXTERNAL
(f EXTERNAL hat) - i.e., the exogenous component of the EXTERNAL. In the second
stage, we estimate the following equation using f EXTERNAL hat in lieu of EXTERNAL:
EMi,T = β0 + β1f EXTERNAL hati,t + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1
+ β4MBi,t−1 + β5LEVi,t−1 + β6CHi,t−1 + β7COMBINED RAMi,t−1
+ β8RD INTi,t−1 + β9AD IND INTi,t−1 + β10GOV ERNANCEi,t−1
+ β11BIG4i,t−1 + β12FIRM AGEi,t−1 + εi,t, (1.3)
(two-digit SIC level).
27 As it is shown in Section 1.4, on average, firms in our sample improve their CSR performance through
EXTERNAL component of CSR SCORE. Thus, using EXTERNAL component (instead of CSR SCORE )
in the first stage of IV (Eq1.3) helps us to better satisfy the inclusion restriction (the treatment (i.e., CSR-
disasters) need to trigger relevant changes in CSR performance).
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where EM is a proxy for absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS DA) and T is t+ 2,
or t+ 3. The coefficient of interest is β1, which provides an estimate of the effect of CSR on
FRQ.28
1.3.5 Validity of The Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach
Simple OLS estimation with CSR as independent and FRQ as dependent variables is subject
to a classic endogeneity problem. CSR reflects a firm choice, and this choice may correlate
with some unobservable firm characteristics that also affect FRQ.29 For instance, big firms
may have higher CSR performance and FRQ at the same time. Further, a potential concern
is that CSR and FRQ are jointly determined.30 CSR firms would be more inclined to
produce better reporting if high ethical standards increase the cost of manipulations. On the
other hand, better information environment (proxied by FRQ) could increase stakeholders’
awareness of firms’ commitment to CSR, making it more beneficial. Thus, to obtain a
consistent estimate of the CSR impact on FRQ, we apply 2SLS approach with predicted
values of CSR as an instrument.
A valid IV requires meeting the following criteria: (1) it has to highly correlate with
the endogenous regressor “instrument strength”); (2) it has to be “as good as randomly
assigned”; (3) the instrument has to predict the outcome variable only through the instru-
mented variable CSR (Atanasov and Black 2016).
To satisfy the first criterion, the exogenous component of CSR has to correlate with
CSR performance. In our case, the first-stage has a single endogenous regressor and a single
instrument. The t-value of latter is 4.44 that is higher than the critical value of
√
10 ≈ 3.2,
allowing us to conclude that our instrument is relevant.
The second criterion, exogeneity of treatment, means that treated firms do not antici-
pate and impact the likelihood or the magnitude of CSR-disasters. Given the rare nature of
28 Equations for the first- and second- stage estimations for the other dependent variables are presented in
Appendix 1.C.
29 e.g. omitted variables - one of the three classical sources of endogeneity
30 e.g. simultaneity - one of the three classical sources of endogeneity
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these events and the fact that we exclude the firms which directly provoked the disasters, it
is unlikely that treated firms can accurately estimate the other firms’ probability of disaster
and adjust the level of CSR.
Another potential concern is that treated and control groups may have different un-
observable trends which may affect the results. For instance, treated industries may have
different pre-treatment CSR-growth trend than the control ones. We do not find evidence of
pre-existing trends (See Figure 1.2). Further, following Christensen et al. 2017 we examine
differences in pre-disasters trends in our outcome variable EXTERNAL across treated and
control groups by mapping out counterfactual treatment effects over our sample period. We
exclude the indicator for the year immediately before the first two disasters, making 2009
the benchmark period. Results in Figure 1.3 show that the counter-factual treatment effects
in the pre-disaster periods are small and statistically indistinguishable from the benchmark
period, which provides additional support for the parallel-trends assumption.
To ensure that some specific firm-level determinants of CSR do not drive the result,
we include a set of control variables in t-1. Finally, as a robustness test we perform PSM on
this set to further ensure that the results are not driven by them.
Third, IV has to satisfy “only-through” (also know as exclusion) restriction. Our
empirical specification requires that IV - exogenous variation in CSR - should neither have
a direct effect on FRQ, nor should it affect FRQ through omitted variables. In general,
we cannot empirically test a direct effect condition. However, we can at least to rule out
the reverse effect of our dependent variable on the instrument, i.e. the possibility that
FRQ directly influences the likelihood of CSR-disasters. It may be argued that there is no
economic reasoning for why the level of accruals or readability would have a direct impact
on the likelihood of a CSR-disaster.
The omitted variables assumption implies that no firm characteristic that can poten-
tially affect FRQ, changes after the CSR-disasters. Although changes in CSR performance
are arguably the most plausible and straightforward outcome of the CSR-disasters, we ac-
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knowledge that there is still some possibility that other firm characteristics alter in the
post-disaster period. For instance, firms can improve their corporate governance quality,
as a signal of commitment to ethical standards and stronger risk-management. However,
our untabulated results show that firms do not systematically improve the quality of corpo-
rate governance. Overall, even though we cannot empirically test whether any other firm
characteristic changes after CSR-disasters, we argue that there is a potential problem for
our identification strategy if this firm characteristic (1) has a direct effect on FRQ and (2)
this effect has the same direction as CSR. Otherwise, it would attenuate our result, but not
amplify it.
Exclusion restriction also requires that no other shocks or events, that could also affect
treated firms, happen around the same time. Such a coincidence could potentially produce
spurious and biased results. Perhaps the most relevant event is the change of KLD method-
ology in 2010. In short, after 2010, companies are estimated for a limited set of industry
specific positive ESG31 indicators.32 However, it is not a quagmire for our research if the
effect of the methodology change is the same for all industries or the difference is random.
On the other hand, this would be a potential problem if the methodology change is system-
atically different for treated and control industries. In other words, if KLD methodology was
changed equally for all industries but ones with SIC codes 13, 29, and 49 it would confound
our results. Despite the fact that this is unlikely, we minimize this concern as discussed pre-
viously. In short, we scale each KLD dimension to its maximum within each industry-year.
This adjustment alleviates the problem that some industries (treated industries) mechani-
cally have greater potential to achieve higher CSR SCORE.
Finally, following prior literature (Angrist and Evans 1998; Bennedsen et al. 2007;
Atanasov and Black 2016) we recognize that the shock is not constant across treated firms,
and the IV only estimates the average effect of improved CSR performance on the subset of
firms that respond to the instrument (“local average treatment effect”). In our settings (as
31 ESG - environmental, social, and governance performance
32 For more details about the evolution of KLD database follow Appendix 1.B.
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it is shown in Table 1.5) “compliers” are mostly those firms in the treated industries that
have low pre-treatment level of CSR. Overall, with this caveat in mind, we believe that our
settings represent a meaningful IV approach.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents the sample distribution by the two-digit SIC code industry. The most
heavily represented industry is Business Services (SIC code 73, 13.27%), followed by Chemi-
cal and Allied Products (SIC code 28, 11.37%), and Electronic and Other Electronic Equip-
ment (SIC code 36, 8.73%). Industry distribution in the sample is consistent with prior
research (Kim et al. 2012).
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for selected variables. All variables are defined in
Appendix A. On average, firms in the sample are socially irresponsible and have CSR SCORE
less than 0 (CSR SCORE mean is -0.21).33 In other words, the average firm in our sample
has more concerns than strengths, consistent with Kim et al. (2012) and Lins et al. (2017).
By construction, the means of earnings management proxies are 0.
The mean value of ADJ ROA is 0.03, indicating that, on average, our sample firms
are more profitable than their industry peers. 90% of the firms is audited by the Big 4
accounting firms. On average, firms’ R&D (advertising) expenditures are 16% (1%) of their
net sales. FIRM AGE 2.70 means, that the average age of the firms in our sample is 13
years.
Table 1.3 presents Pearson correlations. CSR SCORE has negative correlation with the
absolute value of discretionary accruals and abnormal production costs. There is a positive
correlation between CSR proxy and abnormal cash flow from operations (AB CFO), ab-
33 To have comparable with prior research summary statistics (e.g. Kim et al. (2012)) we also tabulate
results for unscaled CSR SCORE. Unscaled CSR SCORE has the following descriptive statistics: obs =
16281; mean = -0.16; std.dev. = 2.23; p25 = -2 p50 = 0 p75 = 1.
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normal discretionary expenses (AB EXP), and COMBINED RAM. Overall, our descriptive
statistics and correlations are consistent with the prior research (Kim et al. 2012).
1.4.2 Relationship between CSR and FRQ
First, we test whether firms that operate in the affected industries (treated firms) experience
negative price revision after CSR-disasters. Specifically, we calculate the cumulative abnor-
mal return (CARs) for each firm and 3 days event window by summing across the 3 days in
an event window. Heflin and Wallace (2017) document that firms in oil and gas industries
after the BP oil spill in 2010 experienced a negative stock price reaction (proxied by cumula-
tive abnormal returns). Muller and Kräussl 2011 find that majority of US firms experience
negative abnormal stock returns after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The negative impact is
stronger for firms with low CSR performance (irresponsible firms) before the hurricane. Our
results (untabulated) show that the means for the 3-day CARs are negative and significant
at the one percent level across all EVENTs. These results supports the premise that firms in
the treated industries experience a negative spillover effect that is caused by CSR-disasters.
According to this line of thought, treated firms have to adjust their CSR performance to
mitigate the effect of CSR-disasters.
To provide perspective on the effect of CSR-disasters, Figure 1.2 plots the evolution of
average EXTERNAL in treated (blue solid line) and control (red dashed line) groups before
and after the treatment. This figure provides three insights. First, EXTERNAL is trending
upward in both treatment and control groups. This trend is consistent with observations in
the previous studies (Flammer 2013, 2015) and emphasizes the importance of using a control
group - not accounting for changes in KLD index at the control group would overstate the
effect of CSR-disasters on CSR performance (proxied by KLD index), as it would capture
some of the time trend.34 Second, before the treatment the difference in the EXTERNAL in
treatment and control groups is relatively constant. Third, following the CSR-disasters, the
34 Partially, we solve this potential source of error by scaling our CSR proxy (CSR SCORE, EXTERNAL,
or INTERNAL). Please find additional discussion of KLD trends and composition in Appendix 1.B.
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two lines diverge: firms in the treated industries increase their EXTERNAL substantially
more compared to the control group. Further, Figure 1.2 provides evidence that two years
after the CSR-disasters treated firms steadily increase their EXTERNAL. However, due to
data availability we cannot follow the long-term dynamics of the treatment effect.
Table 1.4 presents the main results (Eq.1.1). In Columns 1-3 (4-6, and 7-9) the depen-
dent variable is in the year of the CSR-disasters (one year (f ]), and two years (f2 ]) after
the CSR-disasters). The dependent variable in columns 1, 4, and 7 is CSR SCORE, while in
columns 2, 5, and 8 (3, 6, and 9), it is EXTERNAL (INTERNAL). In all models, we include
firm fixed effect because some firms may be more likely to invest in CSR than others and
may have been differently affected by the CSR-disasters. We also control for time-varying
omitted variables by including year fixed effect. In Table 1.5 we re-estimate Eq. (1.1), but
instead of including all observations, we divide treated firms into ones with high and low
CSR performance before the CSR-disasters.35
For each specification, Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 report the coefficient on CSR-disasters
dummy (CSR DISASTER) and its standard error in parentheses. As can be seen, the
coefficient on CSR-disasters is positive and statistically significant for specifications with
EXTERNAL as dependent variable.36 Results in Table 1.5 show that improvement in CSR
performance is mainly driven by firms with low pre-disaster CSR performance.
Following Lins et al. (2017) we examine whether it is a firm’s CSR performance in aggre-
gate (CSR SCORE ) or a specific component of CSR that is important in the post-disasters
period. In Table 1.4 and Table 1.5, we separately estimate the change of EXTERNAL
and INTERNAL components of CSR SCORE after the CSR-disasters, and find that the
improvement in CSR SCORE is entirely driven by EXTERNAL component (Environment,
Community, and Human Rights). Further, the results suggest that firms consistently im-
35 We define treated firms as with high (low) CSR performance if there EXTERNAL performance is greater
(lower or equal) than the medium within industry-year one year before the CSR-disasters. Results are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we define treat firms as with high/low CSR according to pre-
disaster CSR SCORE (instead of EXTERNAL).
36 Increase in EXTERNAL is mainly driven by ENVIRONMENT and HUMAN dimensions.
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prove their CSR performance in three years after the CSR-disasters. This result is consistent
with the idea, that CSR variables are very sticky and it takes time to significantly improve
CSR performance. Overall, the evidence in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 support the hypothe-
sis that treated firms respond to the CSR-disasters by increasing CSR performance mainly
through EXTERNAL component.
Next, we examine whether improvement in CSR performance leads to change in FRQ.
Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 present the results of IV regression analyses of discretionary ac-
cruals and the quality of narrative disclosure. We find a negative relation between CSR
and FRQ. Specifically, in Table 1.6 the estimated coefficient on predicted value of EXTER-
NAL (f EXTERNAL hat) is positive and significant (p < 0.01), indicating that treated firms
manage earnings more through accruals.37 We observe similar results from the regressions of
narrative disclosure (Table 1.6, columns 5 and 6). Together evidence suggest that enforced
CSR leads to deterioration in FRQ. In turn, this result means that firms that are enforced
to increase CSR performance do it mainly through window dressing CSR.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Table 1.8 and Figure 1.1 support robustness of the main results of the paper. Following prior
studies (Atanasov and Black 2016; Flammer and Kacperczyk 2016a) we construct leads and
lags model. Table 1.8 presents treatment dynamics of the CSR-disasters on the change in
CSR performance (proxied by EXTERNAL component). The results show that treatment
is not anticipated by the firms. However, our results reinforces the presumption that treated
and control firms have different CSR performance before the CSR-disasters (coefficients
before the treatment are negative and significant).38
To further enhance the credibility of our results, we next conduct a placebo test. For
37 In untabulated tests we do not find evidence that improvement in CSR performance leads to change in
real activities manipulation (AB CFO, AB PROD, AB EXP, and COMBINED RAM )
38 Ancillary results show that using CSR SCORE as a dependent variable (instead of EXTERNAL) does
not change the conclusion that treatment is not anticipated by the firms. In this specification coefficients
before the treatment are insignificant and close to zero. For brevity, we do not tabulate this test.
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each year of the events we randomly assign treated industry. Then we estimate Eq. (1.1). We
repeat this exercise 1000 times and plot the discretized probability density of the placebo
coefficients in Figure 1.1. The graph shows that the placebo coefficient largely follows a
normal distribution centered at zero (mean = -0.116).
1.5 Additional Analyses
1.5.1 Investment in CSR
The arguments provided so far indicate that, when faced with CSR-disasters, treated firms
increase their CSR to improve their reputation and differentiate themselves from the respon-
sible firm. Further we show that this improvement in CSR has a negative impact on FRQ.
Thus, as we discuss previously, we conclude that CSR-disasters induce window dressing CSR
that is not associated with real changes in corporate ethical standards. However, Owens et
al. (2016) show that idiosyncratic shocks can misspecify discretionary accruals models. For
instance, because of investing in CSR projects, a firm could have a cash flow level that is
lower than the average in the industry (i.e. this firm would have negative AB CFO, which is
a proxy for real earnings management). Also, this firm may have higher Bog Index because
with initiated new projects to increase CSR, managers may have to use more technical ter-
minology (i.e. difficult words that increase Bog Index). Overall, lower FRQ (that is proxied
by discretionary accruals models and Bog Index) potentially could be driven by ‘true’ CSR.
To alleviate this concern, we investigate whether increase in CSR after the CSR-
disasters is associated with financial investments in CSR. Following Di Giuli and Kostovetsky
(2014), we study whether improvement in CSR is associated with higher levels of Selling,
General, and Administrative expenses (SG&A). Evidence in Table 1.9 suggests that ,on av-
erage, improvement in CSR is not associated with increase in SG&A expenses. Only firms
that have high CSR before the CSR-disasters improve their CSR through investing in SG&A.
The conclusion from this result is twofold. First, consistent with the main finding of this pa-
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per, CSR-disasters induce window-dressing CSR that does not entail positive outcomes, such
as improvement in FRQ. Second, this result supports the idea that voluntary CSR (those
firms that have high CSR before the CSR-disasters) have real CSR (that is associated with
investments in CSR), and this CSR performance is associated with high ethical corporate
standards (Kim et al. 2012).39
1.5.2 Risk Management versus Greenness
The above findings provide evidence of a negative relation between CSR and FRQ in the
post-disaster period, when firms are forced to improve their CSR performance. Further, we
find that improvement in CSR performance is not associated with investment in CSR. Thus,
we conclude that improvement in CSR comes mainly from window dressing practices. To
provide more granularity in our results, we repeat our analyses separately for STRENGTHS
and CONCERNS dimensions of CSR SCORE.
Several recent studies have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between
STRENGTHS and CONCERNS (e.g., Kacperczyk (2009), Kim et al. (2014), and Ioan-
nou and Serafeim (2015)). From this perspective, ‘doing good’ ( STRENGTHS ) and ‘doing
no harm’ ( CONCERNS ) are fundamentally different and reflect different underlying mech-
anisms. Thus, subtracting CONCERNS from STRENGTHS would not be reasonable, as
these variables are not perfectly substitutable. Further, Fernando et al. (2017) argue that it is
only decreasing CONCERNS that is associated with firms’ risk and financial cost reduction.
On the other hand, increasing STRENGTHS cannot be explained by any risk management
actions.40 In our settings, it means that if treated firms aim to improve their CSR perfor-
39 We acknowledge that alternative interpretations of this evidence cannot be fully ruled out. Following
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014 we assume that improvement in CSR is associated with investment in SG&A.
However, investment in some CSR dimensions may not show up in higher levels of SG&A account. Thus, no
change in SG&A account may simply mean that firms undertake CSR practices that are recognized through
other accounts.
40 More precisely, Fernando et al. (2017) argue that ENVIRONMENTAL strength and concerns have dif-
ferent impact on firms’ environmental risk exposure and the likelihood of potential losses. We repeat our
analysis with only ENVIRONMENTAL strength and concerns as dependent variables (instead of composite
STRENGTH and CONCERNS. See variable definitions in Appendix 1.A). Our results are qualitatively and
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mance to decrease the likelihood of the disaster repetition (i.e. ‘real’ CSR) they would do
it through decreasing CONCERNS. In turn, if treated firms had reputational purpose (i.e.
window dressing CSR), they would increase CSR via increasing STRENGTHS.
Table 1.10 reports the results of estimating Eq. (2) separately for STRENGTHS and
CONCERNS as dependent variables. The results suggest that firms improve their CSR
performance through increasing STRENGTHS. Coefficient for CONCERNS is negative but
insignificant. These results provide additional evidence that treated firms improve their CSR
performance through window dressing activities that are not related to risk-management
practices and do not reduce possible future losses associated with the disasters.
1.5.3 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity
We examine whether our baseline results differ depending on cross-sectional characteristics
that prior literature has linked to accounting quality.41 First, we study whether corporate
governance quality matters for firms’ reaction to the disasters. Building on the intuition
from prior accounting studies that good corporate governance mechanisms constrain earnings
management (Klein 2002; X. Chen et al. 2015), we expect that firms with better corporate
governance have better FRQ in the post-disaster period.
We use two proxies for corporate governance quality. First, we use the proportion of
independent directors (over board size) one year before the disasters (Ind Dir). If Ind Dir
is higher than the median Ind Dir within the industry-year, we assign the firm to the high
corporate governance quality partition. Otherwise, we allocate it to the low corporate gov-
ernance quality one. Second, we use the entrenchment index (E-INDEX ) developed by
Bebchuk et al. (2008) as an inverse proxy for corporate governance quality. We split firms
to the groups with high and low E-INDEX following the same logic as with Ind Dir. Table
1.11 Panels A and B present results for Ind Dir and E-INDEX, respectively. As expected,
quantitatively similar those that we tabulate for STRENGTHS and CONCERNS below.
41 Note that even though these tests provide more granularity in our results, there is still possibility that
other firm characteristics might have impacted managers’ incentives/ability to manipulate FRQ.
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firms with better pre-disaster corporate governance engage less in earnings management and
have higher readability of their financial disclosure. This result is consistent with the notion
that corporate governance improves corporate transparency and, thus, leads to better FRQ.
Second, we study whether firms with higher debt pressure before the disasters are more
likely to decrease FRQ in the post-disaster period. Prior literature suggests that higher debt
pressure motivates managers to engage more in earnings management activities (Press and
Weintrop 1990; Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Reynolds and Francis 2000). As before, we
split the sample according to the pre-disaster level of leverage. Results in Table 1.12 support
the premise that firms with higher debt pressure (proxied by higher leverage) have more
incentives to manage accruals. We also find that firms with higher leverage are more likely
to decrease readability of their financial disclosure.
1.5.4 Propensity Score Matching
As a final analysis, we conduct propensity score matching (PSM) to further alleviate the
concern that firms in treated and control groups are different. To construct a sample of
firms that are similar to the treated firms, we match each treated firm to a control firm
on the basis of firm-level characteristics using the following procedure. The nearest neigh-
bour is calculated based on six firm-level characteristics: CSR performance (CSR SCORE ),
size (SIZE ), market-to-book (MB), leverage ratio (LEV ), return on asset (ROA), and cash
holdings (CH ). Matching variables are computed as average in the three years preceding the
disasters. This matching procedure is used in prior literature to construct a set of compara-
ble firms (e.g. Flammer 2015). We repeat all main test with the PSM sample (see Appendix
1.D for results.) All results remain qualitative and quantitatively similar to those shown in
the main part of the paper.
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1.6 Conclusion
We study the reaction of firms that operate in industries involved in technological disasters,
which we denote CSR-disasters. There are at least two reasons why affected firms would
improve their CSR in the post-disaster periods. First, firms can decrease their operational
risk by investing in CSR (true CSR). Second, firms can build a positive image and signal
their social and environmental awareness through CSR (window dressing CSR). In both
scenarios, CSR helps improve the relationship with stakeholders. In turn, these firms would
be less penalized by their stakeholders in the post-disaster period.
Using a differences-in-difference approach, we show that firms in the affected industries
improve their CSR performance in post-disasters periods. This is driven by firms with low
pre-disaster CSR performance. Then, using instrumental variables (IV) approach, we show
that increases in CSR performance leads to lower financial reporting and disclosure quality.
Taken together, our evidence suggests that in some particular cases, when managers
are forced to improve firms’ CSR performance, they do so by implementing window dressing
practices that are not associated with real changes in firms’ ethical or safety standards.
Although firms with low CSR performance before the CSR-disasters significantly increase
their CSR rating, we do not find evidence that these firms in fact do increase their CSR
expenditures (proxied by SG&A expenses). The only exception are firms, with high CSR
performance before the CSR-disasters. These firms improve their CSR rating through real
investments in CSR. Our results reinforce the awareness that some CSR practices may lead
to unexpected unfavorable outcomes, in particular deterioration in FRQ.
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APPENDIX 1.A: Variable Definition
Variable Variable Definitions
CSR Disaster
Dummy variable that equals 1 for treated industries after the dis-
asters (including the year of the disaster); and 0 otherwise.
CSR Score
Net score of CSR ratings, measured as total strengths minus total
concerns in five social rating categories of KLD ratings data: com-
munity, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product.
Strenghts
Sum of total strengths in the five social rating categories of KLD
ratings data.
Concerns
Sum of total concerns in the five social rating categories of KLD
ratings data.
Internal CSR Score for diversity and employee relations.
External CSR Score for community, human rights, and environment.
AAC
Signed discretionary accruals, computed from performance-
adjusted cross-sectional modified Jones model.
ABS DA Absolute value of discretionary accruals.
AB CFO Abnormal cash flows from operations.
AB PROD
Abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as
the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories.
AB EXP
Abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are
the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and SG&A ex-
penses.
COMB RAM AB CFO − AB PROD + AB EXP .
bogindex
Bog Index scores for 10-K filings (Bonsall et al. 2017). The
Bog Index data is freely available (https://kelley.iu.edu/bpm/
activities/bogindex.html).
Control variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (MVE)
MB Market-to-book equity ratio
ADJ ROA
Industry-adjusted ROA, where ROA is measured as income before
extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets
LEV Long-term debt scaled by total assets
RD INT R&D intensity (R&D expense/net sales) for the year
AD IND INT
Advertising intensity for the two-digit SIC code industry for the
year
CH
Cash holding ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book
value of assets
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Variable Variable Definitions
ROA
Ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of
assets
BIG4
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by
a Big 4 auditor; 0 otherwise
AGE log(1+#years since a firm appears in CRSP monthly file)
BUSSEG log(1+# of business segments)
GEOSEG log(1+# of geographic segments)
SI Special items scaled by book value of assets
NITEMS
Log of number of non-missing items in Compustat as a proxy for
financial complexity
SGA AD log( SG&A-advertising)
SGA R SG&A/revenue
Ind Dir
Dummy variable that is based on the proportion of independent
directors over the total size of the board (prop ind). Ind ˙Dir takes
the value of one if the firm exhibits a prop ind beyond the median
of its industry in 2009 (year before the disasters) and 0 otherwise.
E − INDEX
Dummy variable that is based on entrenchment index (E index)
(Bebchuk et al. 2008). E-INDEX takes the value of one if the firm
exhibits a E index beyond the median of its industry in 2009 (year
before the disasters) and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX 1.B: MSCI ESG KLD STATS
KLD data starts in 1991 and is based on the assessment of how well firms perform in
environmental, social, and governance issues. KLD covers five universes (see Table A142).
Table A1: KLD Universes
Data Set Universe Time Series Number of Firms** Inclusion in Our Study
Universe A
MSCI KLD 400 Social In-
dex + MSCI USA Index
1991 - present 650 From 2003
Universe B
Largest 1000 U.S. compa-
nies by market capitaliza-
tion
2008-2013 1000 (discounted*) No
Universe C
MSCI KLD 400 Social In-
dex + 1000 Largest U.S.
Companies
2001-2013 1100 (discounted*) No
Universe D
MSCI USA IMI Index 2003-present 2400 Yes
Universe E
Non-U.S. Universe 2013 - present 2600 No
* Universes B and C have been discounted as of STATS-2014 Data Set.
** Number of firms is an approximate average for the time series.
Universe A covers firms that are included in MSCI KLD 400 Social Index & MSCI USA
index. Universe D covers the 3000 largest US firms measured by market capitalization and
are not covered by Universe A. RiskMetrics acquired KLD in 2009 and Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) acquired RiskMetrics in 2010. In 2010 the industry-based key
issue rating model was introduced to KLD. Prior 2010 all of the positive ESG performance
indicators were searched for all of the companies. Starting from 2010, all companies are
assessed for limited set of industry specific positive ESG indicators. Thus, our results can be
affected by the change in the methodology in 2010. We acknowledge this caveat as follows.
First, we apply differences-in-difference approach (DiD) which eliminates two main con-
cerns. First, if the conclusion is done only based on the difference between treated and
control groups in the post-disaster period. In this case, the final result may capture only
the permanent difference between treatment and control. Second, if the conclusion is done
only based on the difference between treatment group before and after the disaster. This
result can be driven by the trends in the database. Thus, if in 2009 or (and) 2010 some
methodological aspects of KLD were changed, this difference is captured by the DiD design.
42 Table A1 is a partial reproduction of the table provided by WRDS and MSCI https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/1154/KLD-on-WRDS.pdf
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Second, we are consistent with the prior literature that uses KLD databases before and
after 2010 and (or) 2011. Some selected examples are Flammer and Luo 2017 (1991-2013),
Petrenko et al. 2016 (1997-2012) and Marano and Kostova 2016 (2007-2011).
44
Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence
from CSR-Disasters
APPENDIX 1.C: 2SLS Estimations
We perform IV estimation with COMBINED RAM and READABILITY as dependent vari-
ables. The first stage for COMBINED RAM :
EXTERNALi,t+1 = β0 + β1CSR DISASTERi,t + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1 + β4MBi,t−1
+ β5LEVi,t−1 + β6CHi,t−1 + β7ABS DAi,t−1 + β8RD INTi,t−1 (A1)
+ β9AD IND INTi,t−1 + β10GOV ERNANCEi,t−1 + β11BIG4i,t−1
+ β12FIRM AGEi,t−1 + εi,t,
The second stage for COMBINED RAM :
RAMi,T = β0 + β1f EXTERNAL hati,t + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1 + β4MBi,t−1
+ β5LEVi,t−1 + β6CHi,t−1 + β7ABS DAi,t−1 + β8RD INTi,t−1
+ β9AD IND INTi,t−1 + β10GOV ERNANCEi,t−1 + β11BIG4i,t−1 (A2)
+ β12FIRM AGEi,t−1 + εi,t,
where RAM is a proxy for real activities manipulation (COMBINED RAM ) and T is t+ 1,
t+ 2, or t+ 3.
The first stage for READABILITY :
EXTERNALi,t+1 = β0 + β1CSR DISASTERi,t + β2LEVi,t−1 + β3CHi,t−1 + β4EARNi,t−1
+ β5RETi,t−1 + β6SIZEi,t−1 + β7BMi,t−1 + β8STD RETi,t−1
+ β9AGEi,t−1 + β10BUSSEGi,t−1 + β11GEOSEGi,t−1 (A3)
+ β12D EARNi,t−1 + β13AFEi,t−1 + β14AFi,t−1 + β15lLOSSi,t−1 + εi,t,
The second stage for READABILITY :
READABILITYi,T = β0 + β1f EXTERNAL hati,t + β2LEVi,t−1 + β3CHi,t−1 + β4EARNi,t−1
+ β5RETi,t−1 + β6SIZEi,t−1 + β7BMi,t−1 + β8STD RETi,t−1
+ β9AGEi,t−1 + β10BUSSEGi,t−1 + β11GEOSEGi,t−1 (A4)
+ β12D EARNi,t−1 + β13AFEi,t−1 + β14AFi,t−1 + β15lLOSSi,t−1 + εi,t,
where READABILITY is bogindex and T is t+ 1 or t+ 2.
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APPENDIX 1.D: Propensity Score Matching
Table A2: Summary statistics for treated and matched control group
Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias | bias | t p> | t |
CSR SCORE U -0.49018 -0.23177 -54.4 -5.68 0.000
M -0.49018 -0.50147 2.4 95.6 0.19 0.846
SIZE U 7.5982 6.7341 53 6.69 0.000
M 7.9053 7.974 -4.2 92.1 -0.36 0.719
MB U 2.2929 2.8058 -18.9 -1.96 0.05
M 2.2013 2.3128 -4.1 78.3 -0.43 0.665
LEV U 0.30454 0.19999 58 6.15 0.000
M 0.30569 0.31861 -7.2 87.6 -0.66 0.507
ROA U 0.00522 0.00387 1 0.12 0.907
M 0.01705 0.01367 2.6 -150.1 0.3 0.767
CH U 0.0479 0.21814 -108.8 -10.18 0.000
M 0.04214 0.05115 -5.8 94.7 -1.17 0.242
This table reports summary statistics for treated and match control group based on single nearest-
neighbour (without caliper), 1-to-1 matching without replacement. The nearest neighbor is calculated
based on six firm-level characteristics: CSR SCORE, size (SIZE), market-to-book (MB), leverage
ratio (LEV ), return on asset (ROA), and cash holdings (CH). Matching variables are computed as
average in the three years preceding the disasters. A bias before and after matching is calculated for
each variable and the change in this bias is stated. This bias is defined as the difference of the mean
values of the treatment group and the (not matched / matched) non treatment group, divided by the
square root of the average sample variance in the treatment group and the not matched non treatment
group. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
46
Chapter 1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence
from CSR-Disasters
Figure A2: Dot graph of covariate balance
47
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APPENDIX 1.E: ASSET 4
KLD data is widely used in prior literature to study the relation between CSR and perfor-
mance (Kim et al. 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Becchetti et al. 2015; Flammer
2015; Khan et al. 2016; El Ghoul and Karoui 2017; Lins et al. 2017; Feng et al. 2018). The
KLD database has a number of advantages over other sources of CSR data, as it covers
a large number of U.S. firms and provides information about different dimensions of CSR,
indicating strengths and concerns per dimension.
Even though KLD suits our research agenda, to enhance the robustness of our results,
we repeat our main analysis (eq.1.1) using ASSET4 to construct an alternative measure for
CSR performance. Table A7 presents the results for selected ASSET4 dimensions.
A split sample analysis based on high and low CSR performance (according to pre-
disaster ESGCombinedScore dimension) supports our main hypothesis. Table A7 shows
that firms with low CSR performance, in fact, do improve their CSR performance in the
post-disaster period. A number of mixed untabulated results are worth mentioning. First,
in the post-disaster period, treated firms marginally improve their emission score, however,
environmental innovation score is either insignificant or negative. Second, community and
product responsibility scores are marginally significant, while workforce and human rights
scores are insignificant. Overall, despite the relative coherence of the conclusions based on
KLD and ASSET4, the results from Table A7 need to be interpreted with caution. We
briefly discuss the main caveats below.
First, as shown by Chatterji et al. 2016, KLD and ASSET443 do not converge even after
adjusting for explicit differences in the definition of CSR accepted in various ratings. Second,
KLD and ASSET4 do not have a one-to-one match between the CSR dimensions. In our
main analysis, we construct EXTERNAL, as our main proxy for CSR, while replicating this
dimension based on ASSET4, remains an empirical question. Third, given the time span
that we use in this paper, we do not achieve a sufficiently large sample when merging the
databases KLD, ASSET4, and those for the control variables. Thus, we cannot replicate
our analyses with ASSET4 on the same sample of firms that we used in our baseline results.
Therefore, our sample here is based only on a match between ASSET4 and control datasets.
In other words, the majority of firms in our main and ASSET4 analysis are different. Table
A6 shows summary statistics for selected variables based on ASSET4 sample. Firms covered
by ASSET4 are bigger, more profitable, and have lower cash holdings. With these caveats in
mind, our analysis based on KLD and ASSET4 both provide meaningful results and overall
support the main hypothesis of this paper.
43 as well as FTSE4Good, Innovest, Calvert, and DJSI
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Table A6: Descriptive statistics of selected variables for ASSET4 sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
SIZE 5167 8.81 1.332 7.945 8.676 9.65
MB 5167 3.891 5.019 1.775 2.849 4.567
ADJ ROA 5172 .058 .11 .03 .064 .107
LEV 5164 .246 .179 .12 .231 .348
RD INT 5167 .104 .37 0 .013 .07
AD IND INT 5167 .012 .027 0 0 .009
CH 5171 .152 .176 .028 .086 .207
ROA 5172 .051 .097 .027 .059 .096
BIG4 5172 .977 .149 1 1 1
SGA AD 4377 6.601 1.363 5.719 6.518 7.441
SGA R 4375 .273 .212 .127 .228 .354
52
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APPENDIX 1.F: Conference Calls and Google Trends
The main premise of this paper is that other firms in the treated industries are negatively
affected by CSR-disasters. Even though we draw from the prior literature on the negative
spillover effect (Desai 2011; Diestre and Rajagopalan 2014; Liang and Renneboog 2017), in
this section, we provide additional suggestive evidence on this assumption. First, we present
conference call transcripts for selected firms that operate in the treated industries (Table
A8). These transcripts support the idea that investors are concerned about other firms’
risk profile and the latter’s preparedness for such disasters. During their conference calls,
mangers, in fact, do discuss and receive questions about the likelihood that their firms may
have had the same problem and explain how their firms are different form the firm that
is involved in the disaster. Overall, the evidence from these conference calls additionally
supports the assumption that other firms in the treated industries are also under suspicion
of lacking sustainability.
Second, we provide additional evidence that stakeholders, other than sophisticated in-
vestors, are also concerned about the disasters and this concern is not firm-specific. We
provide some descriptive evidence on Google search inquiries around the disasters. Figure
A1 shows popularity dynamics inquiries for each of the events, with or without mentioning of
the “guilty” firms. The Y-axis is ranged from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates the highest level
of attention to the event. Figure A1 suggests that stakeholders’ concerns are more about
the disasters in general, rather than specific to the firm. It is especially clear in the case
of San Bruno explosion. The popularity level of the request indicating the company that is
involved in this disaster (PG&E) is indistinguishably small comparing to the level of interest
in the disaster itself. Again, this example indirectly supports the idea that firms other than
the guilty ones also have incentives to react to the disasters. Of course, this evidence needs
to be interpreted with caution, as the same inquiry can be written in multiple ways, which
can affect the popularity of the inquiry.
Table A8: Conference Calls for Selected Firms
Edited Transcript of Southern Co earnings conference call or presentation Wednes-
day, April 27, 2011 at 5:00:00pm GMT
Tom Fanning, Southern Company - Chairman, President, CEO
Turning now to an event which has focused the world’s attention on nuclear energy, I
would like to offer some comments on how we believe that event at the Fukushima plant in
Japan might impact the nation’s existing and future fleet of nuclear power plants. [...] No
doubt, there will be lessons learned from the tragic events at Fukushima that will almost
certainly apply to the current fleet of nuclear generation in America. Certainly, we expect
there will be a thorough, thoughtful review of those facilities located in seismically-sensitive
areas, plants along coastal zones and perhaps other design modifications, particularly with
older plants.
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Edited Transcript of Exelon Corp conference call or presentation Thursday, March
24, 2011 at 1:30:00pm GMT
John Rowe, Exelon Corporation - Chairman, CEO
The earthquake, the tsunami, and the subsequent reactor breakdowns in Japan have
captured the attention of the entire world. Companies like Exelon that are heavily involved
in the nuclear industry have been following the situation with the reactors as closely as we
can. We have daily conference calls with our nuclear management, we work closely with
NEI, we are doing everything we can to understand these events as intimately as possible.
[...](I)t is a very serious event, indeed, and we at Exelon are treating it accordingly. We
have begun the lesson learned process, and the root cause analysis, and we are attempting
to apply all that we can learn to our own power plants.
[...] (W)e have begun focused safety reviews since the event, and our reviews to date con-
tinue to assure us that our plants are safe. Nonetheless, we feel we owe you, our shareholders,
our customers, our employees, and our neighbors, that we continue to ask the question and
we do it regularly.
[...] Chip Pardee has been working closely with NEI leadership to represent the industry
and to coordinate our responses with the Chief Nuclear Officers of our peer companies.
Chris Crane, Exelon Corporation - President and COO
[...] Let me talk now about the comparison and the contrast of the circumstances in
Japan to the Exelon nuclear plants. We do have some plants in our fleet that are similar in
design and containment to those in Japan.
[...] In September 2010, the NRC issued an information notice that provided an update
of the NRC’s activities in seismic research. They released a risk – a safety risk assessment
that summarizes the work that they have performed to date. This information is used to
evaluate potential impacts on plant safety, and to plan any future regulatory actions. Our
Units were last reviewed in 2010.
Hugh Wynne, Sanford C. Bernstein&amp; Company, Inc. - Analyst
It seems to me that there, in all likelihood, will be some Japanese and potentially inter-
national inquiry into the failures at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. And when those lessons
learned are applied in the US, I suspect that the key focus will be plant blackouts and the
ability to maintain the supply of cooling water to reactors and spent fuel pumps under those
conditions. And I don’t think that the utility – that the NRC or utility regulators will limit
their assessment to the causes that triggered the plant blackout in Japan.
[...] I don’t think the focus will be solely on tsunamis or earthquakes. They will think
about other circumstances that could cause plant blackouts like a terrorist attack or a cyber
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attack [...]. My question then is across the entire US fleet, can we draw parallels from
Fukushima Daiichi regarding potential risks that could be – that could parallel those that
have developed in Japan due to plant blackouts? Are there steps that could be (background
noise) or – yes, could be identified today to mitigate those risks? Is there any way in which
we can begin to put a range of cost around potential [uprates] to mitigate risks?
John Rowe, Exelon Corporation - Chairman, CEO
[...] First, we agree with your sobering far-reaching question. We think that’s exactly
what will happen. And thus, our folks have started to say, okay, this will cause questions to
be asked about the entire spectrum of what we call the design basis of the plants. And we’ve
already hired a team of outside experts to help us prepare for just that. [...] They will, of
course, look at the things that you mentioned afresh – terrorism, which of course they have
done, after 9/11. Cyber attacks, the one you mentioned, has already been the subject of
inquiry from federal regulators.
[...] Other environmental effects, and it’s, frankly, impossible for us to put meaningful
numbers on what that can be. I mean, we believe that this will cost us some more money,
but we can’t put numbers and zeros on it, let alone numbers. Yet. Because we simply don’t
know what changes are being talked about for what plants, and indeed, no one knows at the
moment, because the regulator hasn’t fully started this.
Edited Transcript of Devon Energy Corp presentation Thursday, May 27, 2010 at
8:00:00pm GMT
Thomson Reuters Media
Have you had – since the Gulf spill, have you gone back and dotted your own I’s and
crossed your own T’s to make sure everybody’s doing exactly what they are supposed to be
doing?
John Richels, Devon Energy Corporation - President
[...] It’s been a big focus of ours to be absolutely as safe as we can, and as responsible as
we can. And so we are pretty confident that we were doing before and since what we need
to in order to run our operations in the most responsible fashion.
Unidentified Company Representative
[...] (Y)ou may have seen on our website – last year Devon won the MMS Safe award
for operations in the Gulf of Mexico for a large company. That’s an offshore example, but
that’s an illustration of – just the way we look at safety Company-wide.
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Figure A1: Google Trends
Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US
(a) EVENT I: BP Oil Spill. Y-axis is ranged from 0 to 100, where 100 means the highest attention to the
event.
(b) EVENT II: San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion. Y-axis is ranged from 0 to 100, where 100 means the
highest attention to the event.
(c) EVENT III: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster. Y-axis is ranged from 0 to 100, where 100 means the
highest attention to the event.
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Figure 1.1: Probability Density Function of The Placebo Coefficients
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of Average EXTERNAL in Treatment and Control Group
2010 is assigned as treatment year for the control group. Treatment group (EXT treat) -
industries with sic2 = 13, 29, and 49. Control group (EXT contr)- all industries except sic2
= 13, 29, and 49. time - year relative to treatment.
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Figure 1.3: Pattern of the counter-factual treatment effects on EXTERNAL
This figure displays regression coefficient estimates and two-tailed 90%, 95%, and 99%
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the sic2 level. To map out the
pattern in the counter- factual treatment effects we include in Eq. 1.1 indicators for every
year period in the sample except 2009, which serves as the benchmark period (i.e., the
coefficient is constrained to equal zero). In these specification, we measure the pattern in
the counter-factual treatment effects relative to the period immediately prior the disasters.
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10 71 0.44 0.44
13 699 4.29 4.73
15 142 0.87 5.6
16 68 0.42 6.02
20 446 2.74 8.76
23 181 1.11 9.87
24 80 0.49 10.36
25 115 0.71 11.07
26 204 1.25 12.32
27 197 1.21 13.53
28 1,851 11.37 24.9
29 89 0.55 25.45
30 162 1 26.44
31 10 0.06 26.5
32 95 0.58 27.09
33 261 1.6 28.69
34 241 1.48 30.17
35 1,173 7.2 37.37
36 1,422 8.73 46.11
37 536 3.29 49.4
38 1,183 7.27 56.67
39 161 0.99 57.66
42 166 1.02 58.68
Continued on next page
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44 11 0.07 58.74
45 135 0.83 59.57
48 573 3.52 63.09
49 876 5.38 68.47
50 378 2.32 70.79
51 211 1.3 72.09
53 163 1 73.09
54 110 0.68 73.77
55 161 0.99 74.76
56 282 1.73 76.49
57 19 0.12 76.6
58 291 1.79 78.39
59 332 2.04 80.43
72 10 0.06 80.49
73 2,160 13.27 93.76
78 21 0.13 93.89
79 204 1.25 95.14
80 349 2.14 97.29
82 51 0.31 97.6
87 381 2.34 99.94
99 10 0.06 100
Total 16,281 100
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
CSR Score 16281 -.205 .546 -.55 -.25 0
External 16281 .005 .262 0 0 0
Internal 16281 -.204 .402 -.5 -.222 0
ABS DA 16101 .053 .062 .015 .034 .066
AB CFO 16281 0 .097 -.045 -.001 .047
AB PROD 16281 -.001 .173 -.089 .001 .085
AB EXP 16281 -.003 .186 -.095 -.001 .061
COMBINED RAM 16281 -.002 .356 -.193 -.021 .17
SIZE 16276 7.132 1.533 6.002 6.929 8.061
MB 16274 3.104 4.232 1.464 2.26 3.68
ADJ ROA 16281 .031 .15 .01 .05 .096
LEV 16247 .207 .201 .01 .176 .325
RD INT 16202 .163 .717 0 .005 .08
AD IND INT 16202 .011 .026 0 0 .008
CH 16281 .203 .213 .041 .123 .294
ROA 16281 .021 .141 .009 .046 .085
BIG4 16281 .897 .304 1 1 1
FIRM AGE 16281 2.696 .897 2.079 2.708 3.367
SGA AD 14560 5.267 1.447 4.241 5.117 6.162
SGA R 14497 .296 .249 .128 .235 .386
This table shows descriptive statistics of the main sample used in this analysis.
The number of observations from control variables vary according to the test
described in every table from here on. This table shows the number of obser-
vations used in the main analysis from. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.6: Accruals-based earnings management and readability in the post-disaster
period.
Table shows two-stage least square regression results. Columns (1) and (4) show the
first-stage regression results for ABS DA and bogindex based on Eq. (3). Second-stage
results are presented in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) where CSR performance (f External) is
replaced with the predicted values estimated from the first-stage regressions
(f External hat) based on Eq.(4). For columns (2) and (3) the measure of ABS DA is in
t+ 2 and t+ 3, respectively. For columns (5) and (6) the measure of bogindex is in t+ 1
and t+ 2, respectively. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
CSR DISASTER 0.155*** 0.127**
(0.0349) (0.0481)
f External hat 0.0594*** 0.0654*** 7.549* 9.385**
(0.0174) (0.0215) (4.089) (4.534)
SIZE 0.0104 -0.00248 -0.00117 0.00252 -0.0225 0.0983
(0.00842) (0.00191) (0.00189) (0.00658) (0.0805) (0.0822)
MB -0.000423 9.16e-05 0.000478
(0.000953) (0.000267) (0.000339)
ROA 0.0293 0.00136 -0.00929
(0.0260) (0.00871) (0.0123)
LEV 0.0422 -0.00532 -0.0166*
(0.0307) (0.00944) (0.00980)
CH -0.0146 0.0147*** 0.0139**
(0.0246) (0.00497) (0.00536)
COMBINED RAM -0.0144 -0.00545 0.00347
(0.0140) (0.00430) (0.00481)
RD INT 0.00333 0.00567*** 0.00719***
(0.00219) (0.000842) (0.000735)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.6 Continued from previous page
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
AD IND INT 0.522 -0.000410 0.179
(0.432) (0.0650) (0.147)
GOVERNANCE 0.0192*** -0.00166* -0.00241**
(0.00623) (0.000893) (0.00112)
BIG4 0.00470 0.00177 0.00387
(0.0226) (0.00456) (0.00595)
FIRM AGE -0.0646*** 0.00159 0.000545
(0.0164) (0.00341) (0.00492)
MTB 0.000145 -0.0105 -0.0144*
(0.00101) (0.00931) (0.00818)
AGE -0.0540*** 0.496 0.670*
(0.0145) (0.302) (0.342)
SI 0.00202 -1.799*** -1.081**
(0.0460) (0.544) (0.461)
GEOSEG 0.00473 -0.462*** -0.235
(0.0234) (0.153) (0.177)
BUSSEG 0.0148 -0.102 -0.252
(0.0177) (0.249) (0.271)
LN NITEMS -0.146* 4.505*** 4.549***
(0.0753) (1.407) (1.232)
Constant -0.0387 0.0582*** 0.0556** 0.831** 58.10*** 57.78***
(0.0671) (0.0190) (0.0259) (0.411) (7.969) (6.833)
Observations 11,080 11,040 9,306 13,304 15,959 15,149
Adjusted R-squared 0.500 0.276 0.299 0.492 0.869 0.874
Continued on next page
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Table 1.6 Continued from previous page
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
r clust sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 1.7: Accrual-based earnings management and readability in the post-disaster
period depending on pre-disaster CSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
FULL SAMPLE
CSR Disaster 0.155*** 0.127**
(0.0349) (0.0481)
f External hat 0.0594*** 0.0654*** 7.549* 9.385**
(0.0174) (0.0215) (4.089) (4.534)
Observations 11,080 11,040 9,306 13,304 15,959 15,149
CSR < P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.270*** 0.299***
(0.0491) (0.0265)
f External hat 0.0213 0.0255*** 3.035 4.137***
(0.0136) (0.00839) (2.083) (1.533)
Observations 6,207 6,405 5,420 7,170 8,468 8,219
CSR ≥ P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.0667*** -0.0216
(0.0143) (0.0508)
f External hat 0.194** 0.208* -44.74* -52.35
(0.0921) (0.107) (23.22) (34.18)
Observations 4,873 4,635 3,886 6,134 7,491 6,930
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
r clust sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table shows two-stage least square regression results depending on pre-disaster CSR. Columns (1) and (4)
show the first-stage regression results for ABS DA and bogindex based on Eq. 3. Second-stage results are
presented in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) where CSR performance (f External) is replaced with the predicted
values estimated from the first-stage regressions (f External hat) based on Eq. 4. For columns (2)-(3) the
measure of ABS DA is in t+ 2 and t+ 3, respectively. For columns (5) and (6) the measure of bogindex is
in t + 1 and t + 2, respectively. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.8: Leads and lags model
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES External External External
CSR DISASTER -3 -0.0302*** -0.0304*** -0.0331***
(0.00678) (0.00679) (0.00699)
CSR DISASTER -2 -0.0492*** -0.0498*** -0.0534**
(0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0201)
CSR DISASTER -1 -0.0710*** -0.0715*** -0.0755***
(0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0236)
CSR DISASTER 0 0.00905 0.0125 -0.0296**
(0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0119)
CSR DISASTER +1 0.0265 0.0191
(0.0228) (0.0217)
CSR DISASTER +2 0.153**
(0.0633)
CSR DISASTER 3+ 0.268***
(0.0594)
CSR DISASTER 2+ 0.176**
(0.0747)
CSR DISASTER 1+ 0.139***
(0.0287)
Constant 0.0188 0.0173 0.0168
(0.0349) (0.0344) (0.0335)
CONTROLS YES YES YES
Observations 16,281 16,281 16,281
Adjusted R-squared 0.487 0.487 0.486
r clust sic2 YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES
FIRM FE YES YES YES
Table shows the coefficients of the leads and lags estimation
of CSR-disasters on firms’ CSR performance (External) in the
treatment and control groups from three years prior the disasters
until three years after. CSR DISASTER -3 (CSR DISASTER -2 or
CSR DISASTER -1 ) is a dummy variable that equals one for the
treated industries three (two or one) years before the disaster and
zero otherwise. CSR DISASTER +1 (CSR DISASTER +2 ) is a
dummy variable that equals one for the treated industries one (two)
year(s) after the disaster and zero otherwise. CSR DISASTER 1+
(CSR DISASTER 2+ or CSR DISASTER 3+) is a dummy variable
that equals one for the treated industries for all years except the
first one (the firms two; or the first three) after the disaster and zero
otherwise. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Variables
are defined in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.9: Investment in CSR in the post-disaster period depending on pre-disaster CSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




f External hat 0.0613 0.0471 0.0376 0.131**
(0.0237) (0.0349) (0.0260) (0.0547)




f External hat -0.00781 0.0406** 0.0180 0.0790**
(0.0147) (0.0198) (0.0173) (0.0365)




f External hat 0.123** 0.0606 0.103* 0.312**
(0.0546) (0.168) (0.0567) (0.151)
Observations 5,855 5,966 5,941 5,517 5,501
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
r clust sic2 YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES
Table shows the impact of CSR-disasters on CSR investments. Column (1) shows the
first-stage regression result for SG&A investments. For columns (2)-(3) the measures of
SG&A (SGA AD or SGA R) are in t + 1, for columns (4)-(5) in t + 2. *, **, *** Indicate
statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed
test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.10: Strengths and Concerns in the post-disaster period depending on pre-disaster
CSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Strengths Concerns f Strengths f Concerns f2 Strengths f2 Concerns
CSR DISASTER 0.124*** -0.0200 0.118*** -0.0335 0.120*** -0.0294
(0.0404) (0.0763) (0.0397) (0.101) (0.0300) (0.110)
SIZE 0.0106 0.0125 0.0237** 0.0181 0.0289** 0.0396***
(0.00818) (0.0116) (0.00921) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.0122)
ROA 0.00328 -0.0407 0.0242 -0.101** -0.0273 -0.132***
(0.0272) (0.0336) (0.0301) (0.0420) (0.0442) (0.0442)
MB -2.79e-06 0.000735 -0.000747 0.000627 -2.61e-06 -0.000449
(0.000642) (0.000784) (0.000792) (0.000996) (0.00121) (0.000712)
LEV 0.0531 0.00410 0.0193 -0.0382 0.0342 -0.0448
(0.0382) (0.0384) (0.0465) (0.0376) (0.0520) (0.0461)
CH 0.0270 -0.00765 0.00556 -0.00803 0.0550 -0.0456
(0.0401) (0.0514) (0.0523) (0.0357) (0.0556) (0.0359)
Constant 0.0822 0.258*** 0.00680 0.308*** -0.0120 0.240***
(0.0542) (0.0834) (0.0555) (0.0911) (0.0680) (0.0824)
Observations 16,281 16,281 12,968 12,968 10,591 10,591
Adjusted R-squared 0.737 0.614 0.743 0.629 0.754 0.636
r clust sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table shows the impact of CSR-disasters on Strengths and Concerns parts of CSR performance. For columns
(1)-(2) the measures of CSR (Strengths or Concerns) are in t, for columns (3)-(4) in t+ 1, and for columns (5)-(6)
in t+2. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed
test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.11: Accrual-based earnings management in the post-disaster period depending on
pre-disaster corporate governance
Panel A: Accrual-based earnings management depending on pre-disaster proportion
of independent directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
Ind Dir < P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.149*** 0.178***
(0.0163) (0.0287)
f External hat 0.0602* 0.0526** 4.680*** 4.982***
(0.0309) (0.0194) (1.262) (1.837)
Ind Dir ≥ P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.228** 0.175
(0.108) (0.154)
f External hat 0.0439*** 0.0433** 3.243 4.097
(0.0152) (0.0191) (3.934) (5.382)
Panel B: Accrual-based earnings management depending on pre-disaster E-INDEX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
E-INDEX < P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.195* 0.167
(0.115) (0.167)
f External hat -0.00907 -0.00495 -0.344 -0.765
(0.0146) (0.0115) (3.404) (4.273)
E-INDEX ≥ P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.203*** 0.193***
(0.0501) (0.0613)
f External hat 0.0659*** 0.0692*** 5.823** 6.743***
(0.0159) (0.0170) (2.311) (1.720)
Panel A shows two-stage least square regression results depending on pre-disaster proportion of independent
directors. Panel A shows two-stage least square regression results depending on pre-disaster E-INDEX. All
regressions include year and industry fixed effects and a set of control variables. Residuals are clustered
at 2-digit sic level. Columns (1) and (4) show the first-stage regression results for ABS DA and bogindex
based on Eq. 3. Second-stage results are presented in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) where CSR performance
(f External) is replaced with the predicted values estimated from the first-stage regressions (f External hat)
based on Eq. 4. For columns (2)-(3) the measure of ABS DA is in t + 2 and t + 3, respectively. For
columns (5) and (6) the measure of bogindex is in t+ 1 and t+ 2, respectively. *, **, *** Indicate statistical
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Variables are defined
in Appendix 1.A.
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Table 1.12: Accrual-based earnings management in the post-disaster period depending on
pre-disaster leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES f External f2 ABS DA f3 ABS DA f External f bogindex f2 bogindex
LEV < P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.191*** 0.176***
(0.0622) (0.0629)
f External hat 0.0326 0.0388** 3.263 4.962
(0.0202) (0.0184) (2.791) (3.834)
LEV ≥ P(50)
CSR Disaster 0.127*** 0.0820***
(0.0169) (0.0286)
f External hat 0.102*** 0.103** 16.22** 18.70***
(0.0374) (0.0441) (7.025) (6.291)
Table shows two-stage least square regression results depending on pre-disaster level of leverage. All
regressions include year and industry fixed effects and a set of control variables. Residuals are clustered
at 2-digit sic level. Columns (1) and (4) show the first-stage regression results for ABS DA and bogindex
based on Eq. 3. Second-stage results are presented in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) where CSR performance
(f External) is replaced with the predicted values estimated from the first-stage regressions (f External hat)
based on Eq. 4. For columns (2)-(3) the measure of ABS DA is in t + 2 and t + 3, respectively. For
columns (5) and (6) the measure of bogindex is in t+ 1 and t+ 2, respectively. *, **, *** Indicate statistical




Do Markets Reward CSR Firms?
Evidence From Target Beating
Behavior
2.1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an issue of growing interest in the business world,
increasingly considered by investors in forming their portfolios and selecting stocks. For example, in
a recent letter, Larry Fink, BlackRock’s chief executive, wrote that companies have to focus not only
on financial performance but also on their stakeholders, and make a positive contribution to society.
Mr. Fink said that companies were too focused on quarterly results, when ”engagement needs
to be a year-round conversation about improving long-term value,” and emphasized firm’s ability
to manage environmental, social, and governance matters as a necessary attribute of sustainable
growth and good governance, noting that BlackRock was ”increasingly integrating these issues into
our investment process.”1 Despite this increasing role of CSR, and the amply held views that CSR
is associated with long-term value creation, little is known about how CSR shapes firms’ incentives
to meet and beat analyst consensus earnings forecast, which may be a signal of managerial short-
1 Larry Fink, BlackRock’s chief executive, A Sense of Purpose, Larry Finks’ Letter to CEOs https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
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termism and myopia (Graham et al. 2005; Bhojraj et al. 2009). The objective of this paper is to
address this question.
Following prior literature, we define CSR as voluntary, stakeholder-oriented actions that
(1) aim to improve social and environmental conditions, (2) are not required by law, and (3)
extend beyond firm’s profit maximization (Godfrey et al. 2009; Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Liang
and Renneboog 2017). Building on this definition, we split firms into CSR and non-CSR, and
predict that, compared with non-CSR firms, CSR firms have a longer-term horizon, engage less in
target beating behaviour, and as a consequence, suffer lower penalties when missing their earnings
targets. Two key arguments underpin our predictions. First, CSR firms may have different investors
that are less critical of short-term performance (Eccles et al. 2014; Serafeim 2015). Second, high
reputation of CSR firms and their strong connection with stakeholders may help to prevent negative
market expectations regarding future prospects (Godfrey et al. 2009; Lins et al. 2017; Shiu and
Yang 2017) and, thus, mitigate negative price revisions if they miss an earnings target.
In line with our primary argument that CSR firms have longer horizons and attract
long-term investors that are less critical of short-term goals, Eccles et al. (2014) show that CSR
firms are more long-term oriented and consistently engage with stakeholders over longer windows.
Serafeim (2015) argues that firms that provide integrated reporting are more likely to attract long-
term investors, as these investors value information about long-term firms’ prospective. Anecdotal
evidence also supports this view. Consider Unilever and its former CEO, Paul Polman, who is
known for his vision of environment and socially responsible business. Under his management, in
2012, Unilever announced that they would no longer attempt to improve short-term stock prices,2
and would stop issuing quarterly guidance.3
Regarding reputational motives, several empirical papers emphasize high ethical stan-
dards in CSR firms that help to improve trust with stakeholders. Prior literature suggests that
corporate culture has an impact on real economic decisions including incidents of earnings man-
agement (Kim et al. 2012), and tax avoidance (Hoi et al. 2013). In their survey study, Graham
2 The New York Times (November 29th, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/business/
unilever-ceo-paul-polman.html
3 After three years as a CEO in Unilever, the holding by speculative hedge-funds went down from 15% in 2009
to less than 5% in 2012. The Guardian (April 24th, 2012) https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/paul-polman-unilever-sustainable-living-plan
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et al. (2005) show that managers believe that target missing is associated with uncertainty about
firms’ future prospects and is a signal of previously unknown problems and, thus, leads to market
penalties. If high reputation and stronger connections with stakeholders help CSR firms reduce
this threat, CSR firms may receive a lower penalty when they miss their earnings targets. This as-
sumption is consistent with the studies on the insurance role of CSR against idiosyncratic (Godfrey
et al. 2009; Shiu and Yang 2017), and systematic risk (Lins et al. 2017; Albuquerque et al. 2018).
This ‘insurance’ perspective implies that high social capital maps into a stronger relationship with
stakeholders, which has positive real effects in the case of bad news or crisis.
Given the above arguments, overall, we expect that CSR firms that miss their earnings
targets have lower negative price revisions. Regarding the rewards for meeting or beating targets,
the prediction is not as straightforward. There is a conjecture that “the market hammers the stock
price when the firm fails to meet the target, but stock price is relatively insensitive to the degree to
which the target is exceeded” (Graham et al. 2017, p. 43). Thus, the reward for target beating may
be relatively homogeneous across firms, irrespective of specific firm-level characteristics including
being a CSR firm. Bartov et al. (2002) show that market rewards for beating the forecast are
only marginally minor when earnings or expectation management are used. This may suggest
that investors have limited ability to detect earnings management at the earnings announcement
day. In contrast, Gleason and Mills (2008) show that these market rewards are smaller if the firm
beats the forecast by decreasing tax expense, where these cuts are plausibly more visible to market
participants. For CSR firms, the extent to which CSR is visible and creates a goodwill for target-
beating firms is not obvious. In addition, not all CSR practices may always be valuable.4 Therefore,
the extent to which markets reward target beating in CSR firms differently than in non-CSR firms
is an open empirical question that we test in this study.
We follow the design in Bhojraj et al. (2009) and split firms that miss their analysts
forecasts into firms with high and low CSR performance. Second, we identify firms that meet their
earnings targets, to test whether CSR firms receive differential market rewards for target beating.
CSR data comes from KLD, which has been used extensively in prior research to operationalize the
4 Not all CSR practices may be equally valuable for investors. For example, employee satisfaction may be
valuable for investors because it leads to superior financial performance (Edmans and Liu 2011). However,
charity marathon may not be relevant for investors and, thus, do not provide the same ’insurance’ protection.
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CSR construct (Kim et al. 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Flammer 2015; Lins et al. 2017).
We report the following key findings. First, we find that CSR firms have lower negative
price revisions proxied by 3-day returns surrounding the release of an earnings announcement. The
positive effect of CSR is stronger for firms with a prevailing proportion of long-run institutional
investors, measured by Bushee’s classification.5 This result is consistent with our conjecture that
CSR firm investors are less critical of short-run financial performance. To test our ’reputation’
hypothesis, we examine whether CSR firms have better accounting quality, as a proxy for firms’
commitment to high ethical standards in communication with their stakeholders. Consistent with
Kim et al. (2012), we find that CSR firms have lower earnings management both when they miss
and when they beat their targets. This suggests that firm commitment to CSR may help establish
stronger, more trusting relationships with stakeholders which, in turn, pays off when CSR firms
miss their target. This lower penalty could indicate lower stakeholders’ concerns regarding future
prospects. However, according to Bartov et al. (2002), higher accruals quality does not guarantee
higher reward for target beating to CSR firms. We turn to the target beating case next.
Regarding target beating, we do not find evidence that CSR firms receive an extra
reward for exceeding analysts’ earnings expectations. This is consistent with the evidence in Lins
et al. (2017) of asymmetric CSR effects, where CSR pays back in the bad, but not in the good
times. This may indicate that the benefits to CSR firms are constrained to limiting penalties for
target missing, which is consistent with Graham et al. (2005) conjuncture that market rewards to
target beating may be homogeneous across firms. Further, it draws attention to the ‘insurance’
role of CSR (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey et al. 2009; Lins et al. 2017).
CSR reflects a firm choice, which may correlate with unobservable firm characteristics
that also affect the penalty for ‘missers’ or target beating incentives. For instance, top executives’
compensation structure may affect both managers’ commitment to CSR and their incentives. We
address this empirical challenge by following Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016b) methodology and
applying the enactment of constituency statutes as a plausibly exogenous shock for CSR. Using
2SLS approach with predicted values of CSR as an instrument, we confirm our previous findings.
5 Bushee’s personal website for institutional investor classification data, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/
faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.
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We make a number of contributions to prior literature. Our study relates to the large
body of work on target beating behavior (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Bhojraj et al. 2009; Gilliam
et al. 2015), which indicates that CFOs believe that markets penalize firms for missing earnings
targets even by a small margin, and thus, they are ready to sacrifice long-run performance to
achieve these benchmarks (Graham et al. 2005). Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that this penalty
is not homogeneous for all firms, and in particular, that growth stocks receive an asymmetrically
high penalty for missing the target.6 We contribute to this literature by providing evidence that
CSR firms have lower incentives to engage in target beating behavior as they receive lower market
penalties for target missing. Also, we find that compared with their non-CSR counterparts, CSR
firms are more likely to miss the target, consistent with lower incentives for target beating. We also
extend research on the insurance role of CSR. This literature argues that CSR provides insurance
against idiosyncratic risk (Godfrey et al. 2009; Shiu and Yang 2017) and systematic risk (Albu-
querque et al. 2018), such as during the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Lins et al. 2017). Our results
highlight the insurance benefit of CSR.
We are among the first studies to examine whether CSR firms receive differential market
rewards and penalties. The closest studies to ours are those of Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Becchetti
et al. (2013), which differ fundamentally from ours. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) focus on the question
of whether issuance of stand-alone CSR reports provides additional information to the market and
whether this information is useful for analysts, where firms with stand-alone CSR reports have
lower analyst forecast error, concluding that non-financial CSR information reduces information
asymmetry. Becchetti et al. (2013) study find that CSR quality, proxied by accounting transparency,
high corporate governance, and stakeholder risk, is associated with lower analyst forecast errors,
while overinvestment in CSR strengths makes earnings less predictable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature and develops
hypothesis. Section 2.3 describes the data collection procedure and variable measures. Section 2.4
discusses main results. Section 2.5 provides additional tests. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
6 After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Gilliam et al. (2015) do not find evidence of the zero-earnings discontinuity,
indicating target beating behaviour may be on the decline.
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 Motivation for target beating behavior
Prior literature suggests that managers undertake actions to avoid small negative earnings surprise
(Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Eames 2006). To explain why managers attempt to meet
earnings benchmarks, researchers have studied CEO compensation (Matsunaga and Park 2001;
McAnally et al. 2008; Jia 2013; Bennett et al. 2017) and ownership (Quinn 2018) structure, and
capital market consequences of missing benchmarks (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Graham et al. 2005;
Frankel et al. 2010).
From markets perspective, as first documented by Ball and Brown (1968), a positive
relation between earnings and stock returns is well known in the literature. Further research
shows that independent of the firms absolute performance and controlling for earnings management
practices and expectations management, markets still reward fixrms for target beating and penalize
for target missing (Bartov et al. 2002; Bhojraj et al. 2009). Survey research by Graham et al. (2005)
suggests that CFOs believe that markets would penalize them for missing analyst forecast even for
a small amount and thus, are ready to sacrifice long-run performance in order to achieve the
benchmark. CFOs claim that achieving earnings target helps to build credibility with the market.
Further, Frankel et al. (2010) show that missing the target increases the information demands of
investors, proxied by the length and tone of earnings conference calls. This result is statistically,
but not economically significant, supporting the idea that just missing the forecast entails little
incremental investor-driven cost.7 However, the magnitude and the severity may vary depending
on firms’ specific characteristics.
For instance, Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that asymmetrically large negative stock
return for growth firms that miss the forecast is explained by analysts’ optimism (i.e., their over-
estimation of earnings). Thus, we can hypothesize that there is a heterogeneity in terms of how
markets penalize different firms for target missing. Further, we explore whether CSR firms have
7 however, from the equilibrium point of view, the result means either investor-relations cost is minimal or
the firms that miss the target are the only firms for which investor-relations cost is low. In other words,
those firms for which this cost is high already either manipulate earnings or forecast to achieve the target.
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different penalty for target missing and at what extend it depends on investors’ investment horizons
and firms’ reputation.
2.2.2 CSR and the penalties associated to missing earnings targets
Certain types of shareholder structure may affect the shareholders’ (short- and long-term) invest-
ment behavior. For instance, Bushee and Noe (2000) show that firms with a prevailing percentage
of ”transient”8 investors are likely to cut R&D spending to meet earnings target, which reflects
their short-sighted investment behavior. Serafeim (2015) shows that long-term shareholders tend
to prefer to buy and hold shares in firms that provide integrated reporting,9 since these firms
disclose more information about their long-term prospects. In addition, Riedl and Smeets (2017)
argue that socially responsible investors have a longer investment horizon. Taken together, these
findings suggest that CSR firms may have a different shareholder structure which contributes to
lower market penalty for target missing.
The range of results on the performance of socially responsible investments (SRI) in the
existing literature varies widely,10 from little difference between SRI and conventional funds in the
US and the UK (Bauer et al. 2005) to the finding that SRI funds underperform conventional funds
in Continental Europe and Asia-Pacific (Renneboog et al. 2008b). However, SRI have experienced
a strong growth in Continental Europe and Asia-Pacific (Renneboog et al. 2008b) which can rea-
sonably suggest that some investors are willing to forgo a positive net present value in order to
achieve their personal values related to social responsibility. In this vein, El Ghoul and Karoui
(2017) show that compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds have lower performance and lower
performance-flow relationship. Bollen (2007) shows that SR funds have lower volatility, which
confirms that comparing with conventional funds, investors are more loyal for poorly performing
SR funds. Potentially, good reputation and high ethical standards in CSR firms can explain the
existence of more loyal investors. We discuss it next.
Godfrey (2005) argues that corporate philanthropy can generate a positive moral capital
among stakeholders and, later on, this reputation can serve as an ’insurance’ protection. In this
8 those holding lots of stocks with high turnover and short holding periods
9 disclosing CSR performance has to be associated with CSR performance
10 For extensive literature review follow Renneboog et al. (2008a)
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vein, using a set of 1384 firm-related negative events, Shiu and Yang (2017) show that accumulated
social capital serves as an insurance and protects stock and bond prices of CSR firms during a time
of crisis. Similarly, Lins et al. (2017) argue that when there is an overall lack of trust between firms
and their stakeholders, CSR firms perform better due to accumulated social capital that prevents a
drop in the level of trust. The authors show that during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, compared to
non-CSR firms, CSR firms raised more debt and had higher stock returns, profitability, growth, sales
per employee. According to ’signal-jamming’ model by Stein (1989), because the market forecast
already includes a certain level of earnings manipulations, missing the target is considered as a
strong signal of firms’ low future prospects and, thus, penalized by the markets. If CSR firms have
stronger reputation for constraining myopia and short-termism, target-missing may signal absence
of target-beating behavior, rather than poor future prospects. Consistent with this conjecture, Kim
et al. (2012) show that CSR firms are associated with lower level of earnings management as an
outcome of high ethical standards. Moreover, Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that miss the
target but do not engage in earnings management, in the long run, outperform counterparts that
beat the target but engage in earnings management. Thus, we can reasonably assume that the
market would assign lower penalty for target-missing for CSR firms.
Overall, if CSR firms have a shareholder structure that is biased towards long-run in-
vestment horizons, CSR firms will be penalized less for target missing, as long-run investors are
less concerned about short-run targets. Further, the reputation for high ethical standards that
have impact on real economic decisions can serve as an insurance and mitigate markets’ penalty
for target missing to CSR firms. Given this premise, we take the logical next step of investigating
the potential consequences of target missing for CSR firms and formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: CSR firms that miss their forecast have smaller negative price revision comparing
with non-CSR counterparts.
2.2.3 CSR and the rewards associated to beating earnings targets
Prior literature provides conflicting evidence on target-beating rewards for CSR firms. Survey study
by Graham et al. (2005) shows that CFOs have conjecture that markets significantly decrease stock
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prices for target missing, but markets stay relatively insensitive to the extent to which firms beat
the target. If markets are less sensitive to target beating, CSR may not provide extra reward
for exceeding analyst forecasts. Bartov et al. (2002) show that market reward for beating the
forecast is smaller by a statistically, but ’economically minor’ amount when earnings or expectation
management are used. The authors argue that this minor response could be due to the models that
are used to estimate expectation management. Alternatively, managers may have limited ability to
detect the extent of earnings management on the earnings announcement day. In this vein, Gleason
and Mills (2008) argue that tax expense manipulations are more visible to market participants at
the earnings announcement date and thus, the reward has to be lower. The authors show that the
premium for forecast beating is smaller if the firm only beats the target because of decreasing tax
expense. Overall, it is not straightforward to predict from prior literature whether CSR is visible
for market participants and whether the latters value CSR performance for firms that beat the
target. We formulate the following as our second hypothesis:
H2: CSR firms that meet/beat their forecast have the same positive price revision
comparing with non-CSR counterparts.
2.3 Data and Sample Selection
2.3.1 Firm-level data
We begin with CSR data that is obtained from MSCI (formerly KLD). KLD provides information
about social performance along dimensions such as corporate governance, community, diversity,
employee relations, environment, and product. KLD covers the largest 3000 U.S. publicly traded
companies by market capitalization and is used in numerous studies to measure CSR performance
(e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky (2012); Kim et al. (2012); Flammer (2015); Lins et al. (2017)).
We obtain accounting data from Compustat and financial data from CRSP. Following
prior research (e.g., Bhojraj et al. (2009) Kim et al. (2012); Lins et al. (2017)) we remove financial
firms from our sample (SIC codes 6000-6999) as these firms have different characteristics of accruals.
We obtain obtain both forecast and reported earnings from I/B/E/S to ensure consistency (Bhojraj
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et al. 2009). All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their
distributions. Although the exact number of observations depends on the specific regression, the
baseline sample for which we estimate the equations contains 1045 firm-year observations for the
period 2000 - 2015.
2.3.2 Measurement of CSR and earnings surprise
CSR measures
To construct continuous CSR proxy (CSR SCORE), we follow Kim et al. (2012) and from strength-
related measures we subtract concern-related ones among five dimensions: environment, commu-
nity, employee relations, diversity, and product. In 2010 the industry-based key issue rating model
was introduced to KLD. To mitigate this potential problem we scale each KLD dimension by the
maximum value of this dimension in that given year. We construct dummy variable for high (low)
CSR performance such that High CSR (Low CSR) takes the value of one if the firm exhibits a net
KLD score (CSR SCORE) beyond (below) the median of its industry in that given year.
Earnings surprise
Following Bhojraj et al. (2009) we refer to firms that miss expectations (the last analyst consensus
forecast before earnings announcement or target) by one or two cents as ’missers,’ firms that exactly
meet expectations as ’meeters,’ and firms that beat by one or two cents as ’beaters.’11 We use firms
that miss or beat by only one or two cents because we are interested in maximizing the likelihood
that a firm that misses (beats) would have beaten (missed) the target if it had (had not) cut some
of its CSR projects. Following Bissessur and Veenman (2016) we use unscaled earnings surprise
per share, rather than scaled earnings numbers because market participants are mainly concerned
with unscaled earnings numbers.
11 Our conclusions are unchanged if we use five cents threshold.
85
Chapter 2. Do Markets Reward CSR Firms? Evidence From Target Beating Behavior
2.3.3 Empirical Model
To capture the relation between market penalty (reward) for target missing (target meeting and
beating) and CSR, we estimate the following baseline models:
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1CSR SCORE Miss+ β2CSR SCORE Meet Beat
+ β3CONTROLS + εt, (2.1)
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1High CSR Miss+ β2High CSR Meet Beat
+ β3Low CSR Miss+ β4CONTROLS + εt, (2.2)
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1High CSR Miss+ β2High CSR Meet Beat
+ β3Low CSR Meet Beat+ β4CONTROLS + εt, (2.3)
where CAR(-1,+1) is the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day window centered on
the earnings announcement date, and the abnormal return is calculated as the raw stock return mi-
nus the CRSP value-weighted market return.12 CSR SCORE Miss is the interaction term between
CSR SCORE and the dummy variable miss that equals 1 if earnings surprise is -1 or -2 , and 0 if
earnings surprise is 0, 1 or 2. CSR SCORE Meet Beat is the interaction term between CSR SCORE
and the dummy variable meet beat that equals 1 if earnings surprise is 0, 1 or 2 , and 0 if earnings
surprise is -1 or -2. High CSR Miss (High CSR Meet Beat) is interaction between dummy variable
High CSR and dummy variable miss (meet beat); Low CSR Miss (Low CSR Meet Beat) is inter-
action between dummy Low CSR and dummy variable miss (meet beat). CONTROLS is a set of
lagged firm-level standard controls such as firm size, market-to-book, return on assets, leverage,
and cash holdings. We use year and industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects and adjust the standard
errors by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels.
In eq.2.1, we use a continuous proxy for CSR (CSR SCORE), while in eq.2.2 and 2.3,
we use dummy variables High CSR and Low CSR. In eq.2.2, we test whether CSR firms that
miss the target receive higher reward than non-CSR firms that meet or beat the target. In eq.2.3
we test whether CSR firms that miss the target receive lower penalty than non-CSR firms that miss
12 The results are similar when we use Fama-French Three Factor Model and Fama-French Four Factor
Model.
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the target. If CSR firms receive lower penalty for missing the target, we would expect lower initial
stock price reaction to earnings news. Therefore, we predict that the coefficient on the interaction
term between CSR proxy and miss will be positive (β1 > 0).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2.1, we present descriptive statistics for selected variables. All variables are defined in
Appendix 2.A. On average, firms in our sample have more concerns than strengths (CSR SCORE
mean is -0.103), consistent with prior research (e.g., Kim et al. (2012)). In our baseline sample, 43%
of firms are classified as high CSR (High CSR mean is 0.43), which implies that they exhibit a net
KLD score beyond the median of their industry in that given year. Out of those 977 observations,
27% present an EPS figure that falls short of the expected analyst median consensus by a maximum
of 2 cents. On the other hand, 73% of firm-year observation exhibit actual EPS that are equal to
the analysts’ consensus or at most 2 cents beyond that. Out of that 73%, 33.56% of observations lie
at the analysts’ consensus and 66.44% exceed such consensus by at most 2 cents. The cumulative
abnormal returns are on average close to zero in the market adjusted model, the Fama-French 3
factor model, and the Fama-French 3 factor model plus momentum, whereas firms exhibit on average
larger market values compared to book values, low leverage levels, high liquidity and moderately
positive operating performance. Table 2.2 presents Pearson correlations.
2.4.2 Main specification
Table 2.3 presents the main results. The table shows 3-day returns surrounding the release of the
earnings announcement, for CSR and non-CSR firms that miss or meet/beat (MB) the target.
From Columns 1 to 3 we use a continuous measure of CSR (CSR SCORE) as: STRENGTHS -
CONCERNS. Miss is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a firm reported earnings per
share of maximum 2 cents just below the median analyst consensus. Miss Beat is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 whenever a firm reported earnings per share of maximum 2 cents just above
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or on the median analyst consensus. As can be seen, as firms that miss the target increase CSR the
market reduces the penalty those firms would receive. From Columns 4 to 9 we use High CSR as a
measure of CSR, which is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a firm shows
a CSR SCORE score that is above the industry-year median. From columns 4 to 6 we compare
firms that have a high level of CSR and miss earnings targets with firms that have low CSR but
meet or beat earnings targets. This comparison represents that of Bhojraj et al. (2009) when they
compare firms with high accrual quality that miss earnings targets and firms that MB and have low
accrual quality. We find that the first group (firms that miss and have high CSR) show larger levels
of CAR[-1,1] compared to the second group. From columns 4 to 6 we compare firms that have a
high level of CSR and miss earnings targets with firms that have low CSR and also miss earnings
targets. This comparison represents our main hypothesis. As shown, the first group (firms that
miss and have high CSR) show larger levels of CAR[-1,1] compared to the second group, albeit this
result is not very strong. In untabulated test, we we examine the future performance of CSR and
non-CSR firms that miss the target. Following Bhojraj et al. (2009) we calculate portfolio-matched
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 3 months after the earnings announcement date.13
There is some evidence that CSR missers outperform non-CSR missers at the 3-month interval.
Again, these results suggest that comparing with non-CSR firms, CSR-firms are more long-term
oriented and thus, these firms are more likely to underperform in the short-run but outperform in
the long-run.
2.5 Additional Analysis
2.5.1 Effect of long-term institutional investors and high reputa-
tion
The above results provide evidence of a lower penalty for CSR firms for missing the target. Further,
we show that CSR firms do not receive an extra reward for MB the target, indicating that CSR pays
off only in the crisis periods serving as an ’insurance’ protection. These results are consistent with
13 To compute BHARs we follow eq. 2, p.2371, in Bhojraj et al. (2009)
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at least two not mutually exclusive interpretations: either CSR firms have a greater percentage of
long-run investors, who are less critical of short-term financial targets, or/and CSR firms have better
reputation that helps to prevent markets’ negative expectation regarding firms’ future prospects.
That being said, the usefulness of CSR as an ’insurance’ in the short-run likely depends
on the proportion of long-oriented investors who focus on the long-run performance. In particular,
Eccles et al. (2014) show that CSR firms are more long-term oriented and implement processes that
consistently engage with stakeholders over the long-term. Edmans (2011) shows that firms with
highest employee satisfaction (as an alternative proxy for CSR) earn superior long-run returns.
Consequently, we should observe that among the group of CSR firms that miss the target, firms
with a greater proportion of long-oriented investors receive the lowest penalty.
We measure long-term institutional investors with Brian Bushee’s classification of ’tran-
sients,’ ’quasi-indexers,’ and ’dedicated holders,’ depending on the number of stocks in an investor’s
portfolio and its average holding period (Bushee and Noe 2000). To examine whether lower penalty
is at least partially explained by the fact that long-term investors are less critical of short term
targets, we estimate the following regressions:
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1CSR Miss LT + β2CSR Meet Beat LT
+ β3CSR Miss ST + β4CSR Meet Beat ST (2.4)
+ β5CONTROLS + εt,
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1High CSR Miss LT + β2High CSR Miss ST
+ β3High CSR Meet Beat LT + β4High CSR Meet Beat ST (2.5)
+ β5Low CSR Miss ST + β6Low CSR Meet Beat LT
+ β7Low CSR Miss LT + β8CONTROLS + εt,
CAR(−1,+1) = β0 + β1High CSR Miss LT + β2High CSR Miss ST
+ β3High CSR Meet Beat LT + β4High CSR Meet Beat ST (2.6)
+ β5Low CSR Miss ST + β6Low CSR Meet Beat LT
+ β7Low CSR Meet Beat ST + β8CONTROLS + εt,
where independent variables of interest are constructed as triplet interaction between CSR
proxy (continuous in eq.2.4 and dummies in eq.2.5 and 2.6 as defined before), dummy variable
miss or meet beat, and proxy for long (LT ) and short (ST ) investors. All variables are defined in
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Appendix 2.A. We use the same set of control variables as in eq.2.1-2.3. In eq.2.5, we test whether
CSR firms that miss the target and have a proportion of long term investors that is above the
median in a given year have higher reward than non-CSR firms that meet or beat the target but
have proportion of long term investors that is below the median in a given year. In eq.2.6, we
test whether CSR firms that miss the target and have an above-the-median proportion of long
term investors in a given year have lower penalty than non-CSR firms that miss the target and
have proportion of long term investors that is above the median in a given year. If lower penalty
for CSR firms is (partially) explained by the fact that they have a higher proportion of long-term
investors, we expect CSR firms with majority of long-run investors to receive the lowest penalty
for missing earnings target. Therefore, we predict that the coefficient of the triplet interaction will
be positive (β1 > 0).
Table 2.4 reports the results separately for ’quasi-indexers,’ and ’dedicate’ institutional
investors. The results suggest that CSR firms that miss earnings target and have higher proportion
of long-term institutional investors experience lower negative price revision than counterparts.
As pointed out above, another plausible explanation of lower penalty for CSR firms is
that stakeholders have higher trust in these firms and, thus, do not consider failing the target as
a signal of poor firms’ prospects. In contrast, investors may consider CSR firms that marginally
miss the target as the most ethical firms because these firms do not undertake myopic actions to
avoid missing the target. In practice, it is generally difficult to find a sitting in which we can test
the level of trust and tightness of relationship between firms and their stakeholders. However, we
can test whether CSR firms that miss the target refrain from myopic actions that would help to
achieve the target. For instance, Bhojraj et al. (2009) argue that managers engage in earnings
management (EM ) to avoid small negative earnings surprise. If CSR firms that miss the target
have lower level of EM we can reasonably assume that adhering to transparency helps CSR firms
to establish stronger connection with their stakeholders. Then, similar to Lins et al. (2017), we can
assume that stakeholders would treat more favorable CSR firms that miss the target than non-CSR
counterparts.
To estimate this relationship we use the following model:
90
Chapter 2. Do Markets Reward CSR Firms? Evidence From Target Beating Behavior
EM = β0 + β1High CSR Miss+ β2High CSR Meet Beat
+ β3Low CSR Miss+ β4CONTROLS + εt, (2.7)
where dependent variable EM is a proxy for earnings management and is either AAC, ABS DA,
AB EXP, AB CFO, AB PROD, or REM. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.5 presents the results from multivariate regression analyses of discretionary ac-
cruals (columns 1 and 2) and real activities manipulation (RAM ) (columns 3-6). We report results
using signed and absolute value of discretionary accruals (AAC and ABS DA, respectively). Fol-
lowing Roychowdhury (2006), we have three individual proxies for RAM ( AB EXP, AB CFO,
AB PROD) and a combined proxy for RAM (REM ). For the regressions of AB EXP and RAM ,
the estimated coefficient for High CSR Miss is negative and significant. Further, High CSR Miss is
negatively and significantly associated with abnormal production variable, AB PROD. These find-
ings indicate that in contrast to non-CSR firms that MB, CSR firms that miss the target engage in
earnings management less. Overall, this result gives us indirect evidence, that CSR firms may have
higher ethical standards that help to strengthen the relations with stakeholders which, in turn,
helps to mitigate negative market expectations when they miss the target.
2.5.2 Analyst following
The above findings provide evidence of a lower negative price revision for CSR firms in the time
when these firms miss the target. Further, we find that among all firms that miss the target,
CSR firms with the majority of long-term institutional investors receive the lowest negative price
revision. To provide more granularity in our results, we repeat our analyses depending on the
number of analysts that follow a firm.
Several recent studies argue that just missing earnings target is more severe for firms with
a greater number of analysts (Frankel et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2017). We use the same empirical
identification as in eq.2.3-2.6, but instead of high/low proportion of long-run institutional investors
we use the level of analyst following. We construct variable High An (Low An) as a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 whenever a firm’s number of analysts is higher (lower) than the
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median of a given year, industry and total assets’ quartile. The results in Table 2.6 suggest that
among all firms that miss the target, CSR firms with low number of analyst following receive the
lowest market penalty.
2.5.3 The likelihood to miss, beat or meet analysts’ targets
So far, we have argued that comparing with non-CSR firms, CSR firms are less penalized for missing
earnings target. In other words, CSR firms have less incentives to engage in target beating behavior
as these firms receive a lower penalty for missing. Given this result, we take the logical next step
and test whether CSR firms are more (less) likely to miss (beat) the target.
The results in Table 2.7 show that CSR firms have higher (lower) propensity to miss
(beat) earnings target. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that CSR firms do not engage
in target beating behavior.
2.5.4 Dividends
Thus far, the results suggest that CSR firms receive lower penalty for missing earnings target.
Further, we show that CSR firms, comparing with non-CSR counterparts, have higher likelihood
to miss the target. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors treat
CSR firms differently, presumably because of different investment horizons or (and) because of their
closer relations and higher trust in CSR firms.
Another possible reason for receiving lower penalty could be that CSR firms use alter-
native channels to establish stronger connections with investors to ensure lower penalty for missing
earnings target. For instance, Bhattacharya et al. (1979) argue that dividends can serve as a signal
of expected cash flow. Further, shareholders that constantly receive higher dividends may be less
critical of earnings targets. Untabulated results show that CSR firms do not have different divi-
dends, repurchases, and total and net payout yield. This result provides additional support for the
hypothesis that CSR itself is an important determinant for investors, rather than that CSR firms
have different communication channels with their stakeholders.
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2.5.5 Instrumenting CSR with Other Constituency Acts
In this study, we examine the potential impact of CSR on negative (positive) price revision in the
time when a firm misses (beats) analyst consensus forecast. The results provided above indicate
that in the group of firms that misses the target, CSR firms are penalized less in terms of negative
price revision. However, finding a positive impact of CSR on negative price revision may be spurious
if such a relationship is driven by unobserved firm characteristics that improve CSR performance
and mitigate negative market reaction to missing the target. In other words, CSR reflects a firm
choice, and this choice may correlate with some unobservable firm characteristics that also affect
negative price revision. To obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of CSR on the magnitude of
negative price revision, we follow Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016b) methodology and apply 2SLS
approach with predicted values of CSR as instrument.
Following Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016b), we apply enactment of constituency statutes
in 34 states between 1984-2006 as a quasi-natural experiment. This law allows managers to consider
not only shareholders’, but also stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. We apply
a differences-in-difference approach to estimate the effect of constituency statutes on negative price
revision. Table 2.8 presents the results of this estimation. These findings confirm the previous
result that in the group of firms that miss the target, CSR firms are exposed to lower negative price
revision. Further, the results in even columns show that in the group of firms that MB the target,
comparing with non-CSR firms, CSR firms do not receive extra rewards. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that CSR serves as an ’insurance’ and pays off only in the times of crisis.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether CSR affects penalty (reward) for missing (beating) analyst consensus
forecast. Extending existing theories, we argue that first, investors in CSR firms, on average,
have long-term investment horizon and thus are less critical of short-term financial performance,
including target beating. Second, CSR firms have closer relations with their stakeholders, which
ensures that when CSR firms miss the target, stakeholders have less concerns regarding future
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prospects and, thus, penalize these firms less.
To empirically test this theoretical prediction, we compare CAR of CSR and non-CSR
firms that barely miss, meet or beat analyst forecast. We show that in the group of firms that
miss the target, comparing with non-CSR firms, CSR firms experience a less severe negative price
revision. However, in the group of firms that MB the target, CSR firms do not receive a superior
reward. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that CSR serves as an ’insurance’ protection
and thus pays off only in times of crisis.
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Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm miss the last analyst consensus forecast
before earnings announcement (forecast, hereafter) by 1 or 2 cents and 0 if a
firm exactly meet or beat the forecast by 1 or 2 cents (IBES).
beat
Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm beat the forecast by 1 or 2 cents and 0 if a
firm exactly meet or miss the forecast by 1 or 2 cents (IBES).
meet
Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm exactly meets the forecast and 0 if a firm
miss the forecast by 1 or 2 cents or beat the forecast by 1 or 2 cents (IBES).
meet beat
Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm exactly meet or beat the forecast by 1 or 2
cents and 0 if a firm miss the forecast by 1 or 2 cents (IBES).
CSR Variables
CSR SCORE
Net score of CSR ratings, measured as total strengths minus total concerns
in five social rating categories of KLD ratings data: community, diversity,
employee relations, environment, and product.
High CSR
Is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that have CSR SCORE that is above
the median withing industry (2-digit SIC) and year and 0 otherwise.
Low CSR
Is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that have CSR SCORE that is below
the median withing industry (2-digit SIC) and year and 0 otherwise.
STRENGTHS
Net score of CSR ratings, measured as sum of total strengths in five social rat-
ing categories of KLD ratings data: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, and product.
CONCERNS
Net score of CSR ratings, measured as sum of total concerns in five social rating




Signed discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are computed
through the cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted for performance
(Kim et al. 2012).
ABS DA
Absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are com-
puted through the cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted for perfor-
mance (Kim et al. 2012).
AB CFO The level of abnormal cash flows from operations (Kim et al. 2012).
AB PROD
The level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as
the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories (Kim et al. 2012).
AB EXP
The level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are
the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and SG&A expenses (Kim
et al. 2012).
REM REM = AB PROD −AB CFO .
Continued on next page
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Is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that have average number of long-
term investors (following Bushee and Noe (2000) we define ’quasi-indexers’
and ’dedicated holders’ as long-oriented investors) that is above the median
in a given year and 0 otherwise.
ST
Is a dummy variable equals 1 for firms that have average number of long-
term investors (following Bushee and Noe (2000) we define ’quasi-indexers’
and ’dedicated holders’ as long-oriented investors) that is below the median
in a given year and 0 otherwise.
High An
Is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a firm’s number of
analysts is higher than the median of a given year, industry and total assets’
quartile.
Low An
Is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a firm’s number of
analysts is lower than the median of a given year, industry and total assets’
quartile.
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (MVE) (Kim et al. 2012).
MB
Market-to-book equity ratio, measured as MVE/BVE, where BVE is the book
value of equity (Kim et al. 2012).
ADJ ROA
Industry-adjusted ROA, where ROA is measured as income before extraordi-
nary items, scaled by lagged total assets (Kim et al. 2012).
LEV Long-term debt scaled by total assets (Kim et al. 2012).
RD INT R&D intensity (R&D expense/net sales) for the year (Kim et al. 2012).
AD IND INT
Advertising intensity for the two-digit SIC code industry for the year (Kim
et al. 2012).
CH
Cash holding is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book value
of assets (Flammer 2015).
ROA
Is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets
(Flammer 2015).
ROE
Is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the lagged Com-
mon/Ordinary Equity-Total.
EARN Earnings before extraordinary items/beginning total asset (Huang et al. 2014).
BM Book-to-market ratio measured at the fiscal year-end (Huang et al. 2014).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75
CSR SCORE 977 -.103 .494 -.5 -.107 .143
high CSR 977 .43 .495 0 0 1
miss 02 977 .267 .443 0 0 1
meet 02 977 .245 .43 0 0 0
beat 02 977 .488 .5 0 0 1
car 977 -.005 .076 -.044 -.003 .036
car ff3 977 -.004 .076 -.045 -.003 .038
car ff4 977 -.003 .076 -.045 -.003 .038
MB 972 3.588 4.144 1.685 2.696 4.448
SIZE 977 6.855 1.439 5.829 6.576 7.615
LEV 971 .15 .202 0 .055 .248
CH 977 .248 .234 .052 .176 .379
ROA 977 .041 .126 .026 .056 .092
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main specifications of the paper. The
sample is composed of 640 unique firms in an unbalanced panel that ranges from the year 2000 until the
year 2013, with a maximum number of firm-year observations of 977.
97













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2. Do Markets Reward CSR Firms? Evidence From Target Beating Behavior
Table 2.5: The difference in terms of earnings management between High CSR firms that
miss analysts’ targets and Low CSR firms that meet or beat analysts’ targets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AAC ABS DA AB EXP AB CFO AB PROD REM
High CSR Miss -0.01 -0.00 0.04* 0.01 -0.03** -0.05***
(-0.65) (-0.61) (2.06) (1.46) (-2.13) (-3.10)
High CSR Meet Beat -0.00 0.00 0.04* 0.01 -0.03*** -0.05***
(-0.47) (0.68) (1.94) (1.28) (-3.17) (-4.04)
Low CSR Miss 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.75) (0.00) (0.26) (-0.85) (0.16) (0.34)
Size -0.00 -0.00*** 0.03*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01**
(-1.41) (-2.97) (4.21) (0.37) (-3.24) (-2.70)
MB -0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00** -0.01***
(-1.37) (2.85) (1.29) (3.50) (-2.84) (-3.73)
ROA 0.01 -0.08*** -0.22*** 0.31*** -0.27*** -0.55***
(0.37) (-4.51) (-4.68) (6.37) (-3.99) (-5.41)
Leverage 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06** 0.04 0.10**
(0.53) (-1.49) (0.58) (-2.86) (1.23) (2.63)
Cash 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.00 0.02
(0.98) (0.66) (1.59) (-1.65) (-0.11) (0.51)
Constant 0.03 0.07*** -0.24*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.08*
(1.75) (6.76) (-5.37) (0.46) (3.21) (2.12)
Observations 969 969 969 969 969 969
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.21
Table 2.5 shows the results from the following analysis: whether firms that miss (meet or beat) analysts’
targets and exhibit high (low) CSR engage in earnings management. Coefficients are reported with
t-statistics below in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
All regressions include year times industry dummies and standard errors are clustered at the firm and year
level to allow for cross-correlation and autocorrelation in the covariance matrix of standard errors. All
control variables are lagged one period to avoid a bad controls problem.
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Chapter 2. Do Markets Reward CSR Firms? Evidence From Target Beating Behavior
Table 2.7: The impact of High CSR on the propensity to miss, beat or meet analysts’
targets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ordinary Least Squares LOGIT
Miss Beat Meet Miss Beat Meet
High CSR 0.08*** -0.06** -0.02 0.24*** -0.18** -0.04
(4.04) (-2.18) (-0.76) (2.63) (-2.57) (-0.35)
Size 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.02
(0.17) (0.03) (-0.19) (-1.03) (0.82) (-0.26)
MB -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
(-1.03) (1.68) (-0.75) (-1.08) (1.48) (-0.75)
ROA -0.02 0.11* -0.09 0.13 0.22 -0.48*
(-0.19) (1.80) (-1.22) (0.31) (0.82) (-1.74)
Leverage 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.31 -0.00 -0.39
(0.32) (-0.10) (-0.28) (1.11) (-0.00) (-1.08)
Cash 0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.15 0.18 -0.08
(0.46) (-0.91) (0.40) (-0.60) (0.70) (-0.22)
Constant 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.24*** 0.79 -1.10** -2.20*
(9.20) (7.11) (3.53) (1.13) (-2.29) (-1.83)
Observations 969 969 969 969 969 969
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.01
Table 2.7 shows the results from our main specification. Coefficients are reported with t-statistics below in
parentheses. ***, ** and * imply a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions
include year times industry dummies and standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level to allow
for cross-correlation and autocorrelation in the covariance matrix of standard errors. All control variables
are lagged one period to avoid a bad controls problem.
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Table 2.8: Instrumenting CSR with Other Constituencies Acts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,1]
Predicted CSR 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.019*** -0.021*** 0.018*** -0.020***
(3.046) (-4.000) (3.321) (-4.031) (3.229) (-3.716)
Size -0.008** 0.009** -0.011** 0.008** -0.010** 0.008**
(-2.471) (2.627) (-2.910) (2.718) (-2.726) (2.699)
M2B -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*
(-7.222) (-1.597) (-7.228) (-1.615) (-7.100) (-1.735)
ROA 0.028* 0.006 0.019 0.010 0.017 0.013
(1.894) (0.316) (1.256) (0.711) (1.237) (0.922)
Leverage 0.016 -0.025*** 0.021 -0.023** 0.023 -0.022**
(0.701) (-2.963) (0.919) (-2.660) (0.978) (-2.579)
Cash -0.022** -0.016* -0.023** -0.015* -0.019** -0.010
(-2.432) (-1.981) (-2.529) (-1.964) (-2.291) (-1.361)
Observations 269 753 269 753 269 753
Miss Yes No Yes No Yes No
Model Mkt Adj Mkt Adj FF3 FF3 FF4 FF4
Incorporation State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F-Stat 23.13 133 23.13 133 23.13 133
Adj. R2 0.09 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.22
Table 2.8 shows the results from using Other Constituencies Acts to instrument the variable CSR.
Coefficients are reported with t-statistics below in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply a significance level of
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions include year and incorporation state dummies and standard
errors are clustered at the incorporation state level to allow for cross-correlation and autocorrelation in the
covariance matrix of standard errors. All control variables are lagged one period to avoid a bad controls
problem. From Columns 1 to 6 we use a continuous measure of CSR from KLD as: Strengths - Concerns,
instrumented by Other Constituencies following Flammer and Kacperczyk (2017). Odd columns represent
a subsample of firms that miss earnings targets in a given year and even columns represent firms that meet
or beat earnings targets.
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Chapter 3
Different Similarities and Similar
Differences. New Evidence on
Corporate Social Responsibility
3.1 Introduction
Corporate Social responsibility (CSR) has become a strategic concern for firms, responding to the
demand from key stakeholders and investors. For instance, the percentage of S&P 500 companies
that publish sustainability or corporate responsibility reports has increased from 20% in 2011 to
86% in 2018.1 Further, a survey by The Global Impact Investing Network says that over the last 20
years the number of managers that provide ESG (environmental, social, and government) strategies
has increased by 400% (Lofts 2018). Given this growing importance, prior research has extensively
1 According to The Governance & Accountability Institute https://www.sustainability-reports.com/
86-of-sp-500-index-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-2018/
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studied the effect of firms’ CSR activities2 on financial performance,3 risk,4 reporting quality,5
and relations with stakeholders.6 However, among firms with similar CSR performance there may
exist heterogeneity in terms of their CSR strategies. In this paper, I focus on the heterogeneous
properties that arise in firms that have the same CSR performance. In particular, I aim to address
the following questions: Do heterogeneous CSR strategies that underpin the same CSR performance
matter? What can we learn about CSR beyond CSR performance?
Following prior literature, I define CSR as voluntary stakeholder-oriented actions that (1)
aim to improve social conditions, (2) go beyond compliance or legal requirements, and (3) extend
above solely profit maximization (McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Godfrey et al. 2009; Bénabou and
Tirole 2010; Liang and Renneboog 2017). For instance, firms’ practices aimed at reducing carbon
footprint, improving employee policies, and diversity in the workplace can be considered as CSR
dimensions, which together contribute to firms’ CSR performance. Building on this definition, I
argue, that within the same CSR performance firms may have different CSR strategies depending
on the combinations of CSR dimensions.
Prior research has already studied CSR performance and proposed to study independently
positive (strengths) and negative (concerns) aspects of corporate social actions as they may reflect
different underlying mechanisms (e.g., Kacperczyk (2009), Kim et al. (2014), Ioannou and Serafeim
(2015), and Fernando et al. (2017)) or focus on a specific CSR dimension (e.g., Clarkson et al. (2004)
and Fernando et al. (2017)). I continue this line of research by arguing that firms with the same
CSR performance may have different number of strengths and concerns, which reflect various CSR
strategies.7
Anecdotal evidence points toward this conjecture. To illustrate, I use the example of
2 The terms ”CSR activities,” ”CSR performance,” ”CSR engagement,” ”CSR involvement,” ”CSR prac-
tices” have all been used interchangeably, to describe firms’ commitment to CSR. CSR performance is
defined as a sum of positive and negative corporate actions along different social dimensions. A more precise
definition of CSR performance is given in Section 3.3.2.
3 e.g., Lev et al. (2010), Cheng et al. (2014), Lins et al. (2017), and Shiu and Yang (2017)
4 e.g., Godfrey et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2014), Lins et al. (2017), Shiu and Yang (2017), and Albuquerque
et al. (2018)
5 e.g., Kim et al. (2012)
6 e.g., Godfrey (2005), Godfrey et al. (2009), Lev et al. (2010), and Flammer and Luo (2017)
7 For instance, firms A and B have CSR performance equal one. However, firm A has only one strength
while firm B has three strengths and two concerns. I argue that firms A and B have different CSR strategies
that reflect additional to CSR performance information.
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Nike, a public US company that sells their athletic footwear and apparel virtually in all countries
around the world (Nike 2019b). Nike has long been suspected of child labor, sweatshops, and block
of basic labor rights particularly in Nike’s Asian factories. According to The Guardian, between
25% and 50% of the Nike’s Asian factories restrict access to toilets and drinking water during
the work day and deny workers at least one day off in seven (Teather 2005). Nike’s culture of
sexual harassment and gender bias has led to a number of gender discrimination lawsuits from
their former employees (Hsu 2018). At the same time, Nike is constantly recognized as one of the
most environment-friendly companies in the world. According to the Nike Impact Report from
2019, they continuously minimize their environmental footprint by using recycled materials and
consuming renewable energy (Nike 2019a). According to this example, Nike has a slightly negative
CSR performance, as high positive social actions are outweighed with negative ones. First, I argue
that a firm’s positive and negative activities as well as actions along different social dimensions
are interconnected. Second, I posit that another firm with the same CSR performance but with
different number of positive and negative social actions (e.g., a firm that has only one concern) has
different CSR strategy.
I test my predictions using a large sample US publicly-listed firms over the period 2003
to 2013. My CSR data is obtained from MSCI (formerly known as KLD), which rates firms’ CSR
performance on a variety of strengths and concerns along different social dimensions. I calculate the
score for each dimension by taking the difference between corresponding strengths and concerns.
I measure average firms’ CSR performance (CSR Score) by adding the scores of the individual
dimensions. Following the prior research, I consider firms with the same CSR Score as firms that
have similar average CSR performance. I proxy potential heterogeneity among CSR strategies
by calculating summation of the strengths and concerns for firms within the same CSR Score
(net CSR Score). I argue that regardless of the average CSR performance, firms that are in different
net CSR Score quantiles may have different CSR strategies.
I document the following findings. First, I find that firms with the same average CSR
performance but with different number of strengths and concerns vary among different firms’ char-
acteristics. Specifically, firms that have higher total numbers of strengths and concerns (hereafter
H CSR) are older, bigger, more profitable, have less cash and more leverage, and are less research in-
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tense. Second, I show that comparing with the firms that have the same CSR performance, H CSR
firms have higher future CSR performance. Finally, I show that H CSR firms have a negative
association with future accounting performance and stock returns even controlling for CSR perfor-
mance. These results are consistent with the prediction that net CSR Score provides additional
information about firms’ CSR strategies, which is complementary to CSR performance.
My results indicate that firms with similar CSR performance vary across their CSR
strategies, which are associated with different firms’ characteristics, future CSR and financial per-
formance. I add to the literature that studies how firms differ along different CSR dimensions.
Prior research highlights the importance of studying independently strengths and concerns (e.g.,
Kacperczyk (2009), Kim et al. (2014), Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), and Fernando et al. (2017))
or focusing on individual CSR dimensions (e.g., Clarkson et al. (2004) and Fernando et al. (2017)).
My contribution to this literature is twofold. First, I show that there is a heterogeneity between
firms with the same average CSR performance. Second, I show that the heterogeneity between CSR
strategies has an association with future CSR and financial performance, which does not depend on
CSR performance. I argue that performances in different social dimensions may be interconnected
and, thus, studying them individually may lead to biased results. I contribute to this literature by
showing that different CSR strategies may lie between different dimensions (or between strengths
and concerns), thus, should be considered collectively.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and presents our hy-
potheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 3.4 presents results and Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
A large academic literature on CSR widely uses different databases to measure CSR perfor-
mance. ASSET 4,8 Sustainalytics,9 Bloomberg ESG,10 MSCI, IVA11 and MSCI (formerly known
8 e.g., Stellner et al. (2015), El Ghoul et al. (2016), Gibson et al. (2019), and Görgen et al. (2019)
9 e.g., Verheyden et al. (2016), Gibson et al. (2019), Görgen et al. (2019), and Engle et al. (2020)
10 e.g., Gibson et al. (2019)
11 e.g., Cai et al. (2016), Ferrell et al. (2016), Liang and Renneboog (2017), and Gibson et al. (2019)
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as KLD)12 are among the most commonly used CSR data providers.
The KLD database has a number of advantages over other sources of CSR data, as it
covers a large number of US firms and classifies CSR performance along seven social dimensions
(environment, employee relations, community,corporate governance, diversity, human rights, and
product) and six controversial business issues (alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear, and
tobacco). One of the primary measures of firms’ average involvement in CSR activity is CSR Score,
which is calculated by subtracting concern- related from strength-related measures among different
KLD social dimensions.13
Abundant empirical evidence from CSR Score-based studies suggests that CSR engage-
ment improves relations with stakeholders and helps to protect against idiosyncratic (Godfrey et
al. 2009; Shiu and Yang 2017) and systematic risks (Lins et al. 2017; Albuquerque et al. 2018). With
regard to the financial performance, a number of studies find a positive association between CSR
and Tobin’s Q for firms with high consumer awareness (Servaes and Tamayo 2013) and for best-
in-class (benchmarking against CSR performance in industry peers) firms (Awaysheh et al. 2020).
Further, Deng et al. (2013) argue that CSR is an important determinant of merger performance and
show that high CSR acquirers have higher merger announcement returns, and larger increases in
post-merger long-term operating performance. From an accounting perspective, CSR firms are as-
sociated with better financial reporting proxied by earnings management, real operating activities,
and the likelihood of SEC investigation (Kim et al. 2012). Finally, evidence from Gao et al. (2014)
suggests that executives from CSR firms are more likely to refrain from insider trading activities
and, comparing with executives from non-CSR firms, are less likely to trade prior future news and
profit significantly less from insider trades.
The question of whether there is a heterogeneity of CSR strategies among firms with
the same CSR performance has received far less research attention to date. Numerous studies
12 e.g., Godfrey et al. (2009), Kacperczyk (2009), Barnett and Salomon (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Gao et
al. (2014) Becchetti et al. (2015), Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016a), Fernando et al. (2017), Flammer and
Luo (2017), Lins et al. (2017), Flammer and Kacperczyk (2019), Gloßner (2019), Hegde and Mishra (2019),
T. Chen et al. (2020), Awaysheh et al. (2020), and Engle et al. (2020)
13 For instance, Kim et al. (2012) construct CSR Score by subtracting concern- related from strength- related
measures among five social dimensions: environment, employee relations, community, diversity, and product.
Lins et al. (2017) use the same specification, but instead of product dimension use human rights one.
Albuquerque et al. (2018) use all social dimensions but corporate governance.
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have discussed the importance of distinguishing between strengths and concerns (e.g., Kacperczyk
(2009), Kim et al. (2014), Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), and Fernando et al. (2017)). These authors
argue that ’doing good’ (strengths) and ’doing no harm’ (concerns) have a different nature and
underlying mechanisms. For instance, Fernando et al. (2017) emphasize that only environmental
concerns are associated with firms’ risk and cost reduction, while environmental strengths are not
associated with risk management practices. However, if strengths, concerns, and social dimensions
are interconnected, the attempt to consider them individually may lead to biased results.
Anecdotal evidence points toward a positive relationship between corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) and irresponsibility (CSiR). As a case in point, consider the BP oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Two years before the incident, in 2008, the CEO of BP, Tony
Hayward, during the Annual General Meeting, announced that BP’s safety record was among the
best in the oil and gas industry. Under the leadership of Mr. Hayward, ”BP ran operational safety
training sessions for its employees and encouraged a culture of safety in an effort to attend to key
stakeholders such as employees, the community and the environment.”14 However, the oil spill of
2010, destroyed BP’s positive safety records and revealed a lack of ethical and safety standards
that may have prevented the largest marine oil spill in the history.15 Formally, based on the moral
licensing research, Ormiston and Wong (2013) argue that past CSR performance helps managers
to accrue moral credits and become less vigilant toward stakeholders’ needs in the future. Based
on this preposition, the authors find a positive association between past CSR performance and
subsequent CSiR.
According to this line of thought, firms with the same CSR performance (CSR Score)
may vary along other CSR dimensions that may reflect different CSR strategies. For instance,
within the same CSR Score firms may have different summation of the strengths and concerns.16
I state this prediction formally as my first hypothesis:
H1: Firms with the same CSR performance have heterogeneous CSR strategies.
14 The Guardian (Dec 10th, 2013). https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/comapanies-
csr-policies-corporate-irresponsibility-new-study
15 BBC News (January 6th, 2011) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-12124830
16 For instance, within CSR Score = 0, all firms have the same proportion between strengths and concerns
(1:1). However, one firm may have 1 strength and 1 concern, while another one may have 3 strengths and 3
concerns.
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With regard to the future CSR performance, I hypothesize that it varies for firms with the
same current CSR performance, but heterogeneous CSR strategies. The motivation behind this as-
sumption is twofold. First, different CSR strategies (e.g., real/window dressing,17 active/passive18)
may directly impact future CSR performance. Second, CSR strategies may correlate with firms’
characteristics such as a capital structure or different stages of business cycle, which in turn may
affect future CSR performance. For instance, prior literature suggests that CSR performance may
be affected by a firm’s accounting characteristics, such as size, debt, leverage, return on assets, and
cash holdings (Flammer 2015; Flammer and Kacperczyk 2019). The second hypothesis is stated
below:
H2: Firms with the same past CSR performance and heterogeneous CSR strategies
have different future CSR performance.
Similarly, I argue that future economic performance may be different for firms with
the same past CSR performance, but heterogeneous CSR strategies. I formulate the following
hypothesis:
H3: Firms with the same CSR performance and heterogeneous CSR strategies have
different future economic performance.
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Data and sample Selection
To construct my sample, I obtain CSR data from MSCI (formerly known as KLD). This database
covers roughly the 3000 largest U.S. publicly traded companies by market capitalization. The KLD
database is widely used in the literature to measure CSR performance (e.g., Godfrey et al. (2009),
Kacperczyk (2009), Barnett and Salomon (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Flammer and Kacperczyk
17 True CSR is associated with corporate ethical standards. Window dressing CSR is not associated with
firms’ internalization of high ethical standards.
18 Active (passive) CSR is (not) associated with strategic targeting of a certain CSR performance (e.g., a
certain CSR Score, a certain number of strengths, a certain proportion between strengths and concerns)
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(2016a), Fernando et al. (2017), Flammer and Luo (2017)) and in particular to estimate the effect
of CSR on firm performance (e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), Deng et al. (2013), Servaes and
Tamayo (2013), Krüger (2015), Borisov et al. (2016), Lins et al. (2017)). KLD evaluates CSR
performance along different social dimensions (environment, employee relations, community, diver-
sity, product, human rights, and corporate governance) and controversial business issues (alcohol,
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear, and tobacco). As in Kim et al. (2012), I focus on the first
five social dimensions (environment, employee relations, community, diversity, and product).
I obtain accounting data from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP. All con-
tinuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions. Although
the exact number of observations depends on the specific regression, the baseline sample for which
we estimate equations contains 13922 firm-year observations and 2627 unique firms for the period
2003-2013.
3.3.2 Measurement of CSR
I use three different variables to measure CSR performance. I start with CSR Score that I construct
by subtracting concern- related measures (Concerns) form strength-related ones (Strengths) among
five social dimensions: environment, employee relations, community, diversity, and product.
To construct my second and third measures of CSR I, first, calculate the sum of Strength
and Concerns at the firm-year level. This variable is denoted by net CSR Score. Within the same
CSR Score, firms have different net CSR Score. For instance, within CSR Score = 0, one firm has
net CSR Score = 2 (1 Strength and 1 Concern), while another firm has net CSR Score = 4 (2
Strengths and 2 Concerns). I define that the firm has high (low) net CSR Score if the firm is in
the top (bottom) net CSR Score quantile within each year - two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score
group.19
To study the difference and evolution in CSR properties in the firms with different
net CSR Score I segregate them into high and low groups according to their net CSR Score quan-
tile (top or bottom) in year 2003.20 Thus, H CSR 2003 (L CSR 2003) is a dummy variable that
19 I require at least two observations for each year - two-digit SIC industry - CSR SCORE group.
20 the first year of my sample
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equals one if a firm is in the top (bottom) net CSR Score quantile within two-digit SIC industry -
CSR Score group in 2003 and zero otherwise. This variable is fixed at the firm level, and, thus, it
helps me to study whether there is a difference in the properties between firms that had the same
CSR Score but different net CSR Score in 2003.
To measure whether net CSR Score has an impact of firms real economic performance, I
construct H CSR (L CSR) dummy that equals one if a firm is in the top (bottom) net CSR Score
quantile within each year - two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions.
On average, firms in the sample have CSR SCORE with a mean value of -0.186 and a median
value of 0. It means, that an average firm in my sample has slightly less strengths than concerns,
consistent with Kim et al. (2012) and Lins et al. (2017). Average number of Strengths and Concerns
is 1.262 and 1.435, respectively. 75% of firm-year observations in my sample have CSR SCORE
between -2 and 1.
For the control variables, the mean value of ROA is 0.022, indicating that my firms are
more profitable than their industry peers. 89.9% of my sample firms are audited by the Big 4
accounting firms. An average firm in my sample spends approximately 15% (1%) of its sales on
R&D (advertising).
Table 3.2 presents the sample distribution between H CSR and L CSR within each
CSR SCORE. In Columns (1) and (2) H CSR and L CSR are segregated into 2 and 4 quantiles,
respectively. The results indicate that the proportion between H CSR and L CSR varies among
different CSR Score. For 75% of our sample, proportion between H CSR and L CSR is around
80 to 20 percent. For instance, within CSR Score = 0, 73% (27%) of observations are in L CSR
(H CSR) group.
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3.4.2 Future CSR Performance
Table 3.3 contains the results for our primary hypothesis. The results are consistent with
the view that belonging to group H CSR and L CSR is associated with specific firm characteristics.
Specifically, firms that are classified as H CSR are significantly bigger, older, more profitable, have
more leverage, have less cash, and are less research intense than those that are in L CSR group.
Figure 3.1 presents the results for my secondary hypothesis. Figure 3.1 plots the evolu-
tion of CSR Score in L CSR 2003 and H CSR 2003 (orange and green solid lines) nine years after
the segregation into these groups, as well the average sum of Strengths and Concerns (red and blue
dash lines) for L CSR 2003 and H CSR 2003 groups. Two main observations are worth emphasiz-
ing. First, being in L CSR 2003 or H CSR 2003 group is very persistent. Firms that had more
Strength and Concerns in 2003 (i.e. classified as H CSR 2003) continue to have more Strengths
and Concerns nine years after than those firms that were classified as L CSR 2003 in the same
year. Second, comparing with L CSR 2003 firms, H CSR 2003 firms have a higher CSR Score in
the future regardless of beginning CSR Score. For instance, Figure 3.1a present the results for
firms that had CSR Score equal to minus two in 2003. The results indicate that after nine years,
H CSR 2003 firms have CSR Score that is twice as much as those in L CSR 2003 group (2 and 0,
respectively).
To ensure that the future outperformance of H CSR 2003 group is not simply driven
by the year of segregation (2003) I repeat the analysis in Figure 3.1 but for different years of
partition. Specifically, I plot the evolution of average CSR Score in L CSR 200# and H CSR 200#
groups, while CSR Score = 0 in 2004, 2006, 2008, or 2010 (Figure 3.2). For instance, Figure 3.2b
shows the average CSR Score in H CSR 2006 and L CSR 2006 before and after 2006 in which
both groups have the average CSR Score = 0. The results presented in Figure 3.2 suggest that
H CSR 200# firms, comparing with L CSR 200# ones, have higher future CSR Score, regardless
of the segregation year. Notably, the net CSR num is more persistent than CSR Score. HH SC
and LL SC lines never cross, meaning that, regardless of the segregation year, firms either have
high or low net SCORE num.
To provide more perspective on the difference between H CSR 2003 and H CSR 2003
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firms, Figure 3.3 plots the evolution of average Strengths and Concerns in H CSR 2003 and
L CSR 2003 groups within different values of CSR Score in 2003. This figure provides two in-
sights. First, when the beginning CSR Score is negative, H CSR 2003 firms increase Strengths
more rapidly than L CSR 2003 ones, while the difference between Concerns remains the same.
Second, when the beginning CSR Score is positive or zero, L CSR 2003 firms increase Concerns
more rapidly than HH ones, while the difference between Strengths remains the same.
To provide more granularity in the dynamics within H CSR and L CSR groups, Tables
3.4 - 3.10 show the transition probabilities for CSR Score accumulated by an average firm-year.
The last rows and columns include the probability of having a score of 3 or more (for Tables 3.11
and 3.10, a number of Strengths or Concerns of 4). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show CSR Score’s transition
probabilities in t+1 and t+2, respectively. The results show that the diagonal cells have the highest
values, which confirms the stickiness of CSR performance. Transition probability is, on average,
30% higher in t+2 than in t+1.
Tables 3.6 - 3.9 present the transition probabilities for CSR Score in t+1 and t+2. The
results show H CSR firms have higher transition probabilities for CSR Score that L CSR ones,
consistent with the observation from Figure 3.1. Panel A (B) of Tables 3.10 and 3.11 presents the
transition probabilities for Strengths (Concerns) in L CSR and H CSR groups, respectively. The
results show that the transition probability for Concerns is higher for LL firms than for H CSR
ones. This observation is consistent with the results from Figures 3.3c and 3.3d.
3.4.3 The Effect on Real Economic Performance
I estimate various regression models of firms’ economic performance as a function of CSR Score,
H CSR and a number of control variables. Table 3.12 contains my regressions for CSR Score. The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (5) is return on assets (ROA), in columns (2) and (6) is
return on equity (ROE), in columns (3) and (7) is capital expenditure over total asset (CAPEX),
while in columns (4) and (8), it is employment (EMPL). My variable of interest is the firm’s CSR
performance (CSR Score). In all models, I include industry dummies (defined at the two-digit SIC
level) for two reasons. First, some industries may be more likely to invest in CSR than others. Sec-
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ond, CSR’s impact of firms’ economic performance may vary in different industries. I also control
for time trend by including year fixed effect. Because the residuals can be correlated across firms,
for all multivariate analysis, I report test statistics and significance levels based on the standard
errors adjusted by a cluster at the firm level.
Columns (1)-(4) show that firms with higher CSR Score, on average, perform significantly
better than their industry peers. The effect of CSR Score on firms’ economic performance is both
positive and significant among all but CAPEX variables. A one standard deviation increase in
CSR Score (2.19) is associated with 1.3, 2.5, and 30 percentage points increase in ROA, ROE, and
EMPL, respectively.
One concern with the specifications reported in columns (1)-(4) is that strong perfor-
mance that is associated with CSR Score may be due to omitted variables that happen to be
correlated with CSR, rather due to CSR itself. To address this concern, in columns (5)-(8), I con-
trol for a set of firm’s characteristics that have been found to affect performance. Following Lins
et al. (2017) I include cash holdings (CH), short- and long- term debt (Short Debt and Long Debt,
respectively), market-to-book (MB), size (SIZE), and Tobin’s Q. The results presented in columns
(5)-(8) of Table 3.12 confirm that the association between CSR SCORE and performance disap-
pears after I include a set of control variables. Specifically, the association vanishes after we include
SIZE, CH, and Tobin’s Q controls.
Table 3.13 presents my regressions for H CSR dummy. The dependent variables are the
same as in Table 3.12 and the main coefficient under interest is H CSR. In Panels A and B of Table
3.13, I segregate net CSR number into 2 and 4 quantiles, respectively. Dummy variable H CSR
equals 1 for firms in the top net CSR Score quantile within each year -two-digit SIC industry-
CSR Score group and zero otherwise. The models in columns (1) - (4) provide univariate analysis,
while the models in columns (5)-(8) contain the same set of control variables as in Columns (5)-(8)
of Table 3.12.
Consistent with my third hypothesis, I find a negative association between H CSR and
accounting performance (ROA, ROE) and positive relation with investment (EMPL) even after
I include a set of control variables. H CSR is negatively associated with capital expenditures
(CAPEX), but this relation disappears after I include a set of control variables. This finding
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suggests that H CSR firms, on average, have lower accounting performance in the future. On the
other hand, H CSR firms are associated with more implicit contracts with their employees.21 In
Table 3.14 I re-estimate my previous models, but instead of including my dummy H CSR as an
explanatory variable, I divide firms into net SCR num quartiles and include dummies for quartiles
2-4 (the intercept captures the effect of quartile 1). This approach allows me to assess whether
the effect of a firm’s social capital on returns is more pronounced at very high or very low levels
of H CSR #. The results show that firms with higher H CSR # are associated with lower future
accounting performance and more implicit contracts with their employees.
In Table 3.16 I estimate the relation between CSR Score, H CSR, and stock returns. The
dependent variable is either annual raw returns or four-factor model adjusted return. Following
Lins et al. (2017) in addition to the previous set of variables I employ momentum and idiosyncratic
risk (IVOL). In Panels A and B, I segregate net CSR num into 2 and 4 quantiles, respectively.
Columns (1)-(4) show that H CSR has negative association with stock returns, even when I add
the set of control variables. Columns (5)-(8) show that negative association between CSR Score and
stock returns vanishes when I add the set of control variables. Overall, this result is consistent with
the previous observations, that H CSR contains different to CSR Score information, that remains
significant even controlling to a bunch of observable firms’ specific characteristics.
It appear that CSR Score per se is not significantly associated with firms’ economic
performance. Further, H CSR has negative association with accounting performance and stock
returns and positively associated with investment, proxied by the number of implicit contracts
with the employees. Potentially, CSR Score’s impact on firm performance depends not only on
CSR Score but also on H CSR. To incorporate this possibility, I repeat my previous analysis but
argument it with the interaction between CSR Score and H CSR (interaction). Tables 3.15 and
3.17 present the results for accounting performance and investments and stock returns, respectively.
The interaction term between CSR Score and H CSR is insignificant for accounting performance
and stock returns. However, the interaction term is positive and significant for investments, which
are proxied by CAPEX and EMPL. This suggests that higher CSR SCcore together with H CSR
is positively associated with future superior capital and labor investments.
21 The results remain the same if I include lagged CSR Score as additional control variable.
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3.5 Conclusion
I study the heterogeneity in CSR strategies practiced by firms that have the same CSR performance
and its relation with various firm characteristics. Prior literature provides mixed evidence on the
relationship between CSR activities and financial performance, risk, reporting quality, and relations
with different stakeholders, as employees and customers. A part of this variation can be explain
by the differences in CSR strategies within the same CSR performance. Specifically, I argue that
CSR strategies can be proxied by the sum of the number of strengths and concerns within the same
CSR performance.
I show that within the same CSR performance firms differ in size, leverage, cash holdings,
age, profitability, and research intensity depending on their CSR strategies. Further, I show that
different CSR strategies have an association with future CSR, accounting and financial performance,
and investments. Overall, these results provide new evidence on CSR that has not been previously
measured by CSR performance.
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APPENDIX 3.A: Variable Definition
Variable Variable Definitions
CSR Score
Net score of CSR ratings, measured as total strengths minus total con-
cerns in five social rating categories of KLD ratings data: community,
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product.
Strenghts
Sum of total strengths in the five social rating categories of KLD ratings
data.
Concerns
Sum of total concerns in the five social rating categories of KLD ratings
data.
Control variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (MVE)
MB Market-to-book equity ratio
ADJ ROA
Industry-adjusted ROA, where ROA is measured as income before ex-
traordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets
LEV Long-term debt scaled by total assets
RD INT R&D intensity (R&D expense/net sales) for the year
AD IND INT Advertising intensity for the two-digit SIC code industry for the year
CH
Cash holding ratio of cash and short-term investments to the book value
of assets
ROA Ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets
BIG4
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big
4 auditor; 0 otherwise
Long Debt Long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at)
Short Debt Short-term debt (dlc) divided by total assets (at)
Ln Q Natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q
AGE log(1+#years since a firm appears in CRSP monthly file)
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Figure 3.1: CSR Score dynamics for H CSR 2003 and L CSR 2003.
(a) Beginning CSR Score= -2. (b) Beginning CSR Score= -1.
(c) Beginning CSR Score= 0. (d) Beginning CSR SCORE = 1.
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Figure 3.2: CSR Score dynamics for High and Low CSR groups with beginning
CSR Score = 0. High and Low CSR groups are defined in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010,
respectively.
(a) year = 2004. (b) year = 2006.
(c) year = 2008. (d) year = 2010.
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Figure 3.3: Strengths and Concerns dynamics for H CSR 2003 and L CSR 2003.
(a) Beginning CSR Score= -2. (b) Beginning CSR Score= -1.
(c) Beginning CSR Score= 0. (d) Beginning CSR Score = 1.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
CSR Score 13922 -0.186 2.19 -2 0 1
Strengths 13922 1.262 2.183 0 0 2
Concerns 13922 1.435 1.436 0 1 2
SIZE 13922 7.132 1.545 5.996 6.924 8.051
ROA 13922 0.022 0.139 0.009 0.045 0.084
MB 13922 3.111 4.239 1.454 2.258 3.690
LEV 13922 0.210 0.202 0.012 0.179 0.328
CH 13922 0.201 0.214 0.039 0.120 0.288
RD INT 13922 0.149 0.643 0 0.001 0.071
AD IND INT 13922 0.012 0.027 0 0 0.009
BIG4 13922 0.898 0.303 1 1 1
This table shows descriptive statistics of the main sample used in this
analysis. The number of observations from control variables vary according
to the test described in every table from here on. This table shows the
number of observations used in the main analysis from. All variables are
defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.2: Distirbution of H CSR and L CSR withing each CSR Score
(1) (2)
CSR Score Freq. Persent Freq. Persent
-7 L CSR 2 100 2 100
H CSR 0 0 0 0
-6 L CSR 23 74.19 23 100
H CSR 8 25.81 0 0
-5 L CSR 59 69.41 56 93.33
H CSR 26 30.59 4 6.67
-4 L CSR 144 72.36 130 93.53
H CSR 55 27.64 9 6.47
-3 L CSR 521 78.58 492 92.66
H CSR 142 21.42 39 7.34
-2 L CSR 3,074 90.63 3,019 93.21
H CSR 318 9.38 220 6.79
-1 L CSR 3,719 81.83 3,644 87.87
H CSR 826 18.17 503 12.13
0 L CSR 3,524 73.07 3,041 85.88
H CSR 1,299 26.93 500 14.12
1 L CSR 1,639 72.65 1,444 86.83
H CSR 617 27.35 219 13.17
2 L CSR 731 70.22 610 88.02
H CSR 310 29.78 83 11.98
3 L CSR 376 71.62 300 86.21
H CSR 149 28.38 48 13.79
4 L CSR 227 68.37 196 88.69
H CSR 105 31.63 25 11.31
5 L CSR 138 66.03 113 88.98
H CSR 71 33.97 14 11.02
6 L CSR 93 71.54 76 91.57
H CSR 37 28.46 7 8.43
7 L CSR 52 65.82 48 92.31
H CSR 27 34.18 4 7.69
8 L CSR 32 72.73 24 88.89
H CSR 12 27.27 3 11.11
9 L CSR 34 80.95 24 96
H CSR 8 19.05 1 4
10 L CSR 15 83.33 8 100
H CSR 3 16.67 0 0
11 L CSR 7 100 7 100
H CSR 0 0 0 0
In Column 1 dummy H CSR (L CSR) equals one if a firm’s
net CSR Score is above (below) the median within each year -
two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise. In
Column 2 dummy H CSR (L CSR) equals one if a firm is in the
top (bottom) net CSR Score quartile within each year - two-digit
SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise All variables
are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.4: Transition Matrix form t-1 to t. Full Sample.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
-3 564 141 99 58 23 11 0 896
62.95 15.74 11.05 6.47 2.57 1.23 0 100
-2 127 1,653 464 361 57 26 29 2,717
4.67 60.84 17.08 13.29 2.1 0.96 1.07 100
-1 77 494 2,217 426 130 37 35 3,416
2.25 14.46 64.9 12.47 3.81 1.08 1.02 100
0 27 288 625 2,039 366 86 58 3,489
0.77 8.25 17.91 58.44 10.49 2.46 1.66 100
1 5 80 121 312 892 156 61 1,627
0.31 4.92 7.44 19.18 54.82 9.59 3.75 100
2 5 24 20 74 129 373 120 745
0.67 3.22 2.68 9.93 17.32 50.07 16.11 100
3 1 8 11 58 59 95 683 915
0.11 0.87 1.2 6.34 6.45 10.38 74.64 100
Total 806 2,688 3,557 3,328 1,656 784 986 13,805
5.84 19.47 25.77 24.11 12 5.68 7.14 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.5: Transition Matrix form t-2 to t. Full Sample.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
-3 357 192 146 102 48 29 11 885
40.34 21.69 16.5 11.53 5.42 3.28 1.24 100
-2 161 803 642 440 112 44 57 2,259
7.13 35.55 28.42 19.48 4.96 1.95 2.52 100
-1 118 635 1,299 518 175 52 52 2,849
4.14 22.29 45.59 18.18 6.14 1.83 1.83 100
0 60 427 631 1,231 396 122 71 2,938
2.04 14.53 21.48 41.9 13.48 4.15 2.42 100
1 14 139 178 338 496 180 98 1,443
0.97 9.63 12.34 23.42 34.37 12.47 6.79 100
2 7 47 34 97 144 203 141 673
1.04 6.98 5.05 14.41 21.4 30.16 20.95 100
3 1 16 10 76 73 105 521 802
0.12 2 1.25 9.48 9.1 13.09 64.96 100
Total 718 2,259 2,940 2,802 1,444 735 951 11,849
6.06 19.06 24.81 23.65 12.19 6.2 8.03 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.6: Transition Matrix from t-1 to t for L CSR firms.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
-3 285 64 42 27 10 3 0 431
66.13 14.85 9.74 6.26 2.32 0.7 0 100
-2 61 737 188 130 30 16 15 1,177
5.18 62.62 15.97 11.05 2.55 1.36 1.27 100
-1 41 246 1,297 263 56 17 12 1,932
2.12 12.73 67.13 13.61 2.9 0.88 0.62 100
0 13 158 382 1,250 213 38 26 2,080
0.63 7.6 18.37 60.1 10.24 1.83 1.25 100
1 5 33 64 167 494 77 30 870
0.57 3.79 7.36 19.2 56.78 8.85 3.45 100
2 4 6 11 36 61 214 41 373
1.07 1.61 2.95 9.65 16.35 57.37 10.99 100
3 0 6 2 25 20 38 266 357
0 1.68 0.56 7 5.6 10.64 74.51 100
Total 409 1,250 1,986 1,898 884 403 390 7,220
5.66 17.31 27.51 26.29 12.24 5.58 5.4 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.7: Transition Matrix from t-2 to t for L CSR firms.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
190 81 68 52 22 8 4 425
44.71 19.06 16 12.24 5.18 1.88 0.94 100
-2 73 378 276 192 55 28 28 1,030
7.09 36.7 26.8 18.64 5.34 2.72 2.72 100
-1 69 333 802 345 89 24 21 1,683
4.1 19.79 47.65 20.5 5.29 1.43 1.25 100
0 31 261 441 767 235 62 35 1,832
1.69 14.25 24.07 41.87 12.83 3.38 1.91 100
1 9 55 93 189 277 94 48 765
1.18 7.19 12.16 24.71 36.21 12.29 6.27 100
2 5 13 14 54 74 123 52 335
1.49 3.88 4.18 16.12 22.09 36.72 15.52 100
3 0 10 2 29 32 41 194 308
0 3.25 0.65 9.42 10.39 13.31 62.99 100
Total 377 1,131 1,696 1,628 784 380 382 6,378
5.91 17.73 26.59 25.53 12.29 5.96 5.99 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.8: Transition Matrix from t-1 to t for H CSR firms.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
-3 99 26 20 10 4 5 0 164
60.37 15.85 12.2 6.1 2.44 3.05 0 100
-2 25 105 47 23 7 3 6 216
11.57 48.61 21.76 10.65 3.24 1.39 2.78 100
-1 20 41 169 54 34 7 7 332
6.02 12.35 50.9 16.27 10.24 2.11 2.11 100
0 6 29 80 229 68 23 17 452
1.33 6.42 17.7 50.66 15.04 5.09 3.76 100
1 0 12 23 75 172 58 20 360
0 3.33 6.39 20.83 47.78 16.11 5.56 100
2 0 6 2 24 40 84 56 212
0 2.83 0.94 11.32 18.87 39.62 26.42 100
3 1 1 1 15 18 35 237 308
0.32 0.32 0.32 4.87 5.84 11.36 76.95 100
Total 151 220 342 430 343 215 343 2,044
7.39 10.76 16.73 21.04 16.78 10.52 16.78 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.9: Transition Matrix from t-2 to t for H CSR firms.
CSR Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
-3 66 36 32 17 9 8 5 173
38.15 20.81 18.5 9.83 5.2 4.62 2.89 100
-2 29 45 56 29 16 5 15 195
14.87 23.08 28.72 14.87 8.21 2.56 7.69 100
-1 28 56 108 59 39 17 12 319
8.78 17.55 33.86 18.5 12.23 5.33 3.76 100
0 17 40 78 158 87 37 20 437
3.89 9.15 17.85 36.16 19.91 8.47 4.58 100
1 5 20 44 84 112 56 35 356
1.4 5.62 12.36 23.6 31.46 15.73 9.83 100
2 0 12 6 30 41 47 69 205
0 5.85 2.93 14.63 20 22.93 33.66 100
3 1 3 2 24 21 41 187 279
0.36 1.08 0.72 8.6 7.53 14.7 67.03 100
Total 146 212 326 401 325 211 343 1,964
7.43 10.79 16.6 20.42 16.55 10.74 17.46 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.10: Transition Matrix from t-1 to t for Strengths and Concerns of L CSR firms.
Panel A: Strengths L CSR firms
Strengths 0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 3,876 460 89 29 29 4,483
86.46 10.26 1.99 0.65 0.65 100
1 271 1,058 133 37 25 1,524
17.78 69.42 8.73 2.43 1.64 100
2 51 91 367 58 29 596
8.56 15.27 61.58 9.73 4.87 100
3 24 14 48 170 42 298
8.05 4.7 16.11 57.05 14.09 100
4 908 178 42 41 265 1,434
63.32 12.41 2.93 2.86 18.48 100
Total 5,130 1,801 679 335 390 8,335
61.55 21.61 8.15 4.02 4.68 100
Panel B: Concerns L CSR firms
Concerns 0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 1,674 586 166 17 4 2,447
68.41 23.95 6.78 0.69 0.16 100
1 291 1,875 399 55 8 2,628
11.07 71.35 15.18 2.09 0.3 100
2 146 271 977 87 18 1,499
9.74 18.08 65.18 5.8 1.2 100
3 24 46 68 211 33 382
6.28 12.04 17.8 55.24 8.64 100
4 607 361 151 57 203 1,379
44.02 26.18 10.95 4.13 14.72 100
Total 2,742 3,139 1,761 427 266 8,335
32.9 37.66 21.13 5.12 3.19 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.11: Transition Matrix from t-1 to t for Strengths and Concerns of H CSR firms.
Panel A: Strengths H CSR firms
Strengths 0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 139 63 15 5 3 225
61.78 28 6.67 2.22 1.33 100
1 70 415 74 21 5 585
11.97 70.94 12.65 3.59 0.85 100
2 20 53 231 68 27 399
5.01 13.28 57.89 17.04 6.77 100
3 6 12 42 173 67 300
2 4 14 57.67 22.33 100
4 10 70 37 37 490 644
1.55 10.87 5.75 5.75 76.09 100
Total 245 613 399 304 592 2,153
11.38 28.47 18.53 14.12 27.5 100
Panel B: Concerns H CSR firms
Concerns 0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 153 90 11 2 0 256
59.77 35.16 4.3 0.78 0 100
1 76 417 114 19 5 631
12.04 66.09 18.07 3.01 0.79 100
2 22 82 221 85 13 423
5.2 19.39 52.25 20.09 3.07 100
3 3 29 60 120 52 264
1.14 10.98 22.73 45.45 19.7 100
4 9 66 54 54 396 579
1.55 11.4 9.33 9.33 68.39 100
Total 263 684 460 280 466 2,153
12.22 31.77 21.37 13.01 21.64 100
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.12: Operating performance and CSR Score
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
CSR Score 0.00595*** 0.0114*** 5.72e-05 0.138*** 0.000189 -0.000570 0.000313 -0.00193
(0.00103) (0.00268) (0.000308) (0.0152) (0.000766) (0.00223) (0.000323) (0.00622)
SIZE 0.0181*** 0.0373*** -0.00240*** 0.604***
(0.00143) (0.00389) (0.000585) (0.0110)
MB -0.000752 0.00559 -0.000132 0.00896***
(0.000655) (0.00354) (0.000125) (0.00217)
CH -0.226*** -0.369*** -0.0424*** -0.664***
(0.0158) (0.0425) (0.00369) (0.0634)
Long Debt -0.0906*** 0.00534 -0.00714 0.216***
(0.0135) (0.0498) (0.00482) (0.0710)
Short Debt -0.0806** 0.00851 -0.0492*** 0.796***
(0.0360) (0.122) (0.0119) (0.218)
ln Q 0.0600*** 0.0844*** 0.0261*** -0.941***
(0.0105) (0.0280) (0.00229) (0.0471)
Constant 0.111*** 0.234*** 0.0596*** 1.842*** -0.0358 -0.101* 0.0582*** -1.489***
(0.0221) (0.0561) (0.00933) (0.205) (0.0221) (0.0570) (0.0105) (0.135)
Observations 13,922 13,920 13,903 13,853 13,822 13,820 13,803 13,758
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.026 0.410 0.235 0.230 0.071 0.437 0.749
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table shows that results of the relationship between operating performance and CSR Score. All independent
variables are in t-1. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on
a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.13: Operating performance and H CSR
Panel A
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
H CSR 0.0206*** 0.0389*** -0.00302** 0.872*** -0.00620* -0.0188* -0.000781 0.124***
(0.00368) (0.0108) (0.00132) (0.0504) (0.00340) (0.0107) (0.00126) (0.0228)
CONTROLS NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,922 13,920 13,903 13,853 13,822 13,820 13,803 13,758
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.025 0.410 0.289 0.230 0.072 0.437 0.751
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
H CSR 0.0268*** 0.0448*** -0.00469*** 1.098*** -0.0108** -0.0359** -0.00224 0.205***
(0.00539) (0.0154) (0.00170) (0.0710) (0.00503) (0.0151) (0.00167) (0.0363)
CONTROLS NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,331 11,330 11,317 11,273 11,244 11,243 11,230 11,190
Adjusted R-squared 0.103 0.026 0.416 0.301 0.241 0.072 0.440 0.727
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table shows the results of the relationship between operating performance and H CSR. All independent
variables are in t-1. In Panel A dummy H CSR equals one if a firm’s net CSR Score is above the median within
each year-two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise. In Panel B dummy H CSR equals
one if a firm is in the top net CSR Score quartile within each year-two-digit SIC industry-CSR Score group and
zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on
a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.14: Operating performance and H CSR. Quartile Dummies of H CSR
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
H CSR 4 0.0261*** 0.0428*** -0.00468*** 1.101*** -0.00817* -0.0313** -0.00212 0.180***
(0.00522) (0.0152) (0.00166) (0.0706) (0.00477) (0.0146) (0.00162) (0.0347)
H CSR 3 0.0182*** 0.0361*** -0.00240 0.766*** -0.00568 -0.0165 -0.000415 0.0902***
(0.00394) (0.0118) (0.00160) (0.0522) (0.00365) (0.0119) (0.00153) (0.0245)
H CSR 2 0.0117** 0.00109 -0.00422** 0.448*** -0.00445 -0.0334** -0.00299* 0.0339
(0.00525) (0.0174) (0.00187) (0.0526) (0.00466) (0.0167) (0.00177) (0.0252)
SIZE 0.0190*** 0.0402*** -0.00210*** 0.587***
(0.00156) (0.00406) (0.000551) (0.0107)
MB -0.000756 0.00558 -0.000130 0.00904***
(0.000653) (0.00353) (0.000125) (0.00216)
CH -0.226*** -0.367*** -0.0423*** -0.672***
(0.0159) (0.0425) (0.00370) (0.0629)
Long Debt -0.0906*** 0.00538 -0.00729 0.214***
(0.0135) (0.0498) (0.00481) (0.0707)
Short Debt -0.0787** 0.0156 -0.0480*** 0.769***
(0.0359) (0.122) (0.0119) (0.216)
ln Q 0.0588*** 0.0802*** 0.0258*** -0.918***
(0.0107) (0.0284) (0.00232) (0.0469)
Constant 0.115*** 0.244*** 0.0610*** 1.820*** -0.0394* -0.111* 0.0574*** -1.413***
(0.0212) (0.0546) (0.00941) (0.207) (0.0220) (0.0577) (0.0105) (0.134)
Observations 13,922 13,920 13,903 13,853 13,822 13,820 13,803 13,758
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.025 0.411 0.301 0.230 0.072 0.437 0.751
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table shows that results of the relationship between operating performance and H CSR. H CSR is segregated
into quartiles, where each variable is set as a dummy that corresponds to a specific quartile. For instance, H CSR 4
is set to one if a firm is in the fourth quartile of net CSR Score and zero otherwise. The intercept captures the effect
of quartile one. All independent variables are in t-1. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are defined
in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.15: Operating performance and H CSR. Interactions between CSR Score and
H CSR.
Panel A
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
H CSR 0.0177*** 0.0337*** -0.00301** 0.812*** -0.00622* -0.0184* -0.000759 0.125***
(0.00365) (0.0108) (0.00131) (0.0478) (0.00340) (0.0107) (0.00125) (0.0228)
CSR Score 0.00545*** 0.00877*** -0.000287 0.109*** 0.000163 -0.00228 -0.000118 -0.0106
(0.00112) (0.00307) (0.000330) (0.0125) (0.000866) (0.00260) (0.000337) (0.00653)
interaction -0.000344 0.00643 0.00185*** 0.00604 0.000320 0.00761 0.00179*** 0.0310**
(0.00172) (0.00589) (0.000619) (0.0314) (0.00132) (0.00505) (0.000590) (0.0133)
Constant 0.109*** 0.230*** 0.0607*** 1.726*** -0.0389* -0.110* 0.0580*** -1.422***
(0.0220) (0.0560) (0.00939) (0.216) (0.0220) (0.0568) (0.0105) (0.134)
CONTROLS NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,922 13,920 13,903 13,853 13,822 13,820 13,803 13,758
Adjusted R-squared 0.097 0.027 0.411 0.312 0.230 0.072 0.437 0.751
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B
VARIABLES ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL ROA ROE CAPEX EMPL
H CSR 0.0251*** 0.0442*** -0.00403** 1.085*** -0.0114** -0.0349** -0.00162 0.218***
(0.00553) (0.0154) (0.00164) (0.0722) (0.00508) (0.0149) (0.00163) (0.0370)
CSR Score 0.00532*** 0.00864*** -0.000293 0.0948*** 0.000127 -0.00243 -0.000184 -0.0101
(0.00123) (0.00335) (0.000344) (0.0127) (0.000955) (0.00296) (0.000354) (0.00705)
interaction -0.00153 0.00450 0.00198** 0.0341 -0.00177 0.00461 0.00193** 0.0437**
(0.00308) (0.00937) (0.000865) (0.0457) (0.00239) (0.00836) (0.000846) (0.0194)
Constant 0.0947*** 0.193*** 0.0502*** 1.823*** -0.0486* -0.183*** 0.0506*** -1.305***
(0.0252) (0.0525) (0.00535) (0.228) (0.0271) (0.0597) (0.00758) (0.167)
CONTROLS NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,331 11,330 11,317 11,273 11,244 11,243 11,230 11,190
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.026 0.416 0.319 0.240 0.072 0.440 0.728
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table shows the results of the relationship between operating performance and H CSR, CSR Score and their
interaction. All independent variables are in t-1. In Panel A dummy H CSR equals one if a firm’s net CSR Score
is above the median within each year-two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise. In Panel B
dummy H CSR equals one if a firm is in the top net CSR Score quartile within each year-two-digit SIC industry-
CSR Score group and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively, based on a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.17: Stock Returns and H CSR. Interactions between CSR Score and H CSR.
Panel A
VAR RET AB RET RET AB RET
CSR Score -0.0187*** -0.00700 -0.00650 -0.00208
(0.00556) (0.00457) (0.00619) (0.00530)
H CSR -0.0777*** -0.0248* -0.0479*** -0.0219
(0.0164) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0154)
interaction 0.0158* 0.0101 0.00457 -0.00267
(0.00891) (0.00760) (0.00920) (0.00783)
Constant 0.141* -0.00617 0.254 -0.139
(0.0838) (0.0756) (0.230) (0.181)
CONTROLS
Observations 5,054 4,832 3,193 3,136
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.016 0.276 0.148
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES
Panel B
VAR RET AB RET RET AB RET
CSR Score -0.0188*** -0.00690 -0.00573 -0.000827
(0.00611) (0.00493) (0.00664) (0.00561)
H CSR -0.0596** -0.0304 -0.0689*** -0.0605***
(0.0249) (0.0198) (0.0246) (0.0208)
interaction 0.00456 0.0156 -0.0135 -0.00340
(0.0186) (0.0143) (0.0162) (0.0120)
Constant 0.108 0.0210 0.216 -0.166
(0.0975) (0.105) (0.309) (0.233)
CONTROLS
Observations 4,107 3,904 2,452 2,403
Adjusted R-squared 0.174 0.014 0.271 0.155
r clust gvkey YES YES YES YES
i.fyear YES YES YES YES
i.sic2 YES YES YES YES
This table shows the results of the relationship between stock returns and H CSR,
CSR Score and their interaction. All independent variables are in t-1. In Panel A
dummy H CSR equals one if a firm’s net CSR Score is above the median within
each year-two-digit SIC industry - CSR Score group and zero otherwise. In Panel
B dummy H CSR equals one if a firm is in the top net CSR Score quartile within
each year-two-digit SIC industry- CSR Score group and zero otherwise. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively,
based on a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables
are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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